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Chapter I: Introduction
Introduction
At the conclusion of a 2018 concert, Russian feminist punk group Pussy Riot presented a
guiding maxim to the audience: “Freedom doesn’t exist unless you fight for it every day”
(Dawson, 2018, p. 16). Having been the subjects of unlawful and arbitrary punishment including
prolonged detainment and compulsory labor sentences, these women have become symbols of
rebellion in Russia. Besides being musicians, artists, and media outlet managers, they are, above
all else, hooligans. Vaguely defined but frequently invoked, the criminal charge of hooliganism
in Russia is a political tool used to suppress dissent and uphold the authoritarian ideals of Putin’s
regime.
While the term ‘hooligan’ conjures images of neon costumes, environmental activists,
and punk music, it is necessary to identify what legally defines a hooligan. Article 213 of the
Russian Criminal Code identifies hooliganism as such:
1. Hooliganism, that is, a gross violation of the public order manifested in patent contempt
of society and attended:
a) by the use of weapons or articles used as weapons;
b) by reason of political, ideological, racial, national or religious hatred.
2. The same deed committed by a group of persons by previous concert, or by an organised
group, or connected with resistance to a representative of authority or to any other person
who fulfills the duty of protecting the public order or who suppresses violation of public
order.

Punishments include fines ranging from 300,000 rubles (about $4,500) to 1,000,000 rubles
(about $15,000) or compulsory labor sentences. In a country where the average monthly salary is
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barely 41,000 rubles, or $625, disorderly conduct and ideas come at a large cost (“Russia average
monthly wages,” 2019).
‘Hooliganism,’ in this sense of the term, is not to be confused with hooliganism in the
context of sports games. While the former describes a criminal act, the latter is a generalized
mode of unruly public conduct undertaken by fans to demonstrate devotion to their team through
intimidation directed at the other team. Such actions may also carry racist or nationalistic
overtones through violence. It is true that both meanings of the term encompass actions often
frowned upon by the general public, and it is possible to draw parallels between the two.
However, this distinction is necessary to narrow the scope of the paper to the parameters of
Article 213 and not disorderly behavior in Russia in general.
The Russian Constitution explicitly defines the country as democratic and states a
commitment to the values of international law. However, it would be naïve to claim that Russia
is a fully functioning democracy. In fact, much literature holds that Putin has instituted a
personalized regime with authoritarian inclinations. By equating support for his power with a
“love of country and its culture,” he has crafted a political system giving him the individualized
power to define both friend and foe (Smyth, 2014, p. 568). As such, there are multiple but
contradicting claims to governance that use conventional democratic norms as a means rather
than an end. This paper addresses the legitimacy of hooligan laws in order to test Russia’s claims
to democracy, which depend partially on its success or failure in the fulfillment of human rights.
If they are found to be false, then Russia has, indeed, embraced authoritarianism at the expense
of the rights of its own citizens.
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Research Significance
Existing in a limbo of state classification, Russia acts as a model for states seeking
alternative views on the fulfillment of human rights. Its trajectory on civil and political liberties,
especially the freedoms of speech and expression, could form a dark precedent for
nondemocratic and authoritarian states. In this way, the punishment of alleged hooliganism acts
as a proxy for the general obstruction of rights in Russia. For this reason, monitoring the state of
human rights in Russia is especially critical to studies on upholding democratic norms globally.
A secondary reason why Article 213 is worthy of study is that while there has been
scholarship concerning hooliganism in the past, literature about its modern forms and
implications is scarce. That being said, one of the aims of this research is to offer insights about
hooliganism today and how it may relate to its previous iterations. In addition, the findings in
this paper can contribute to literature about crime in Russia more generally, especially as it may
be seen in the context of comparative law.
While the constitution of the Russian Federation nominally affirms its status as a
democracy, the reality is quite the opposite. Under Putin’s regime, Russians live in a functionally
authoritarian system with severely limited civil and political freedoms. In 2018, Freedom House
gave Russia a Freedom Rating of 6.5, with Political Rights and Civil Liberties scores of 7 and 6,
respectively (“Freedom in the world,” 2018). The accompanying report details the concentration
of power in Putin’s office, maintained through the ability to manipulate elections at all levels of
government and to limit the power of the opposition (“Freedom in the world,” 2018). Under
these conditions, the people have little power to speak up when authorities disregard their rights
and continue to consolidate their personal power. Nonetheless, as a signatory of international
laws regarding human rights and freedoms, Russia cannot avoid the responsibilities bestowed by
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them. Thus, in evaluating the legitimacy of the hooligan laws, both domestic and international
law will be considered.
Literature Review
Previous studies of hooliganism in Russia have focused mostly on the 20th century.
Modern hooligans mainly receive the attention of journalists and human rights groups rather than
scholars. At the same time, there has been no single, unified work that attempts to link the
hooliganism of the past to that of the present. This fact accounts for the variety of sources
employed in this paper, spanning a wide range of disciplines and time periods. Two broad
themes pervade the analysis: the use of law and manipulation of norms as expressions of power
and the interpretation of human rights in international law.
Power and Resistance
The question of the efficacy of defiance in the face of a looming authoritarian regime
rests on themes of cultural and social power. Expressions of power, according to James Scott, are
“attempts to create and maintain a certain view of what decent acceptable behavior should be”
(1985, p. 23). A proper analysis of power in society must be situated in a broader “social text,”
which consists of a canon of ideological, cultural, and other forces (Scott, 1985, p. 23). This view
stands in contrast to more conventional understandings of power, which emphasize the role of
social consensus in lending legitimacy to leaders or groups. While the norms governing
acceptable behavior are constantly in flux due to changing dynamics, such as the rise and fall of
socialist ideology in Russia, not all expressions of power and control are fully justified.
Hooliganism, then, must be understood as being enforced according to elite notions of the social
text rather than as an inevitable outgrowth of cultural norms.
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According to Gramsci, social control manifests itself in the form of “domination” or of
“intellectual and moral leadership” (Femia, 1987, p. 24). The latter constitutes “hegemony,”
defined as “an order in which a common moral language is spoken” (Femia, 1987, p. 24).
Gramsci further argued that hegemony was the “normal” form on control in advanced capitalist
societies (Femia, 1987, p. 31). Elites will seek to craft and disseminate norms in order to govern
public conduct, which is a product of intellectual and moral inclinations. A critical component of
this process is “consent,” referring to a “psychological state” involving passive acquiescence to
predefined norms (Femia, 1987, p. 24, 37). As will be discussed shortly, not all consent comes
freely.
Power is further expressed and maintained through the “politics of reputation” in which
societal elites possess the power to impose their norms of behavior on non-elites (Scott, 1985, p.
24). The reverse is not also true. This process is done with minimal regard to what non-elites
actually perceive to be acceptable norms. When the interests of the two groups are not aligned,
the former may wield their power in an attempt to persuade the latter that their interests are, in
fact, aligned. This process is identified as “control by convincing” and may include minor
concessions to the non-elites (Scott, 1985, p. 23).
This concept closely parallels Gramsci’s argument that elites heavily influence the
“ideological sectors” of society, such as the mass media, and therefore have the means to
“engineer consent” to their policies (Scott, 1985, p. 39). Such conciliatory measures are typically
short-term in focus or provide benefits too small to prompt a deep solution to inequalities and
injustices. In others words, though the hegemonic system may be based on consent, non-elites
often “wear their chains willingly” since they are unable to perceive reality as it stands (Femia,
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1987, p. 31). Consent, then, is often manufactured rather than authentic, weakening the
legitimacy of elite power.
Persuasion alone is not always sufficient. In any given situation, the elites have an arsenal
of coercive psychological tools and mechanisms meant to enforce compliance and deference.
However, this may fall short of wide-scale violence, as such actions may stoke revolutionary
sentiment. Instead, powers pursue a strategy of “routine” or “everyday” repression based on
restrained intimidation which may include methods such as sporadic arrests and cumbersome
legal restrictions (Scott, 1985, p. 274). While elites have a vested interest in ensuring maximal
compliance with their norms, they also have a conflicting interest in minimizing risks to their
rule. Hence, periods of harsh repression may be accompanied by heavy-handed efforts to
maintain public trust or compliance through temporary concessions. An unbalanced power
dynamic of this magnitude would be difficult to achieve in a well-functioning democracy based
on accountability and the rule of law.
Elites rarely maintain complete control over the social text because of the ever-present
possibility of resistance. While publicly engaging with the social text in ways that seem to
reaffirm the dominance of elite values, individuals may participate in “offstage” acts—that is,
those that carry subtle inclinations of resistance without directly challenging the status quo
(Scott, 1985, p. 26). Compliance, then, can be performed without substance. However, scholars
may dispute as to what actually constitutes resistance as opposed to subversive but isolated and
apolitical actions. Scott notes that such acts are typically categorized as follows (1985, p. 292):
Real resistance… is (a) organized, systematic, and cooperative, (b) principled or selfless,
(c) has revolutionary consequences, and/or (d) embodies ideas or intentions that negate the
basis of dominate itself. Token, incidental, or epiphenomenal activities… are (a)
unorganized, unsystematic, and individual, (b) opportunistic and self-indulgent, (c) have
9

no revolutionary consequences, and/or (d) imply, in their intention or meaning, an
accommodation with the system of domination.

Given this dichotomy, however, Scott further argues that such a distinction is not
necessary and may even hinder the study of the motivations behind and effects of resistance.
More formal ways of expressing discontent often prove to be a luxury reserved for the very
powers that are to be challenged. This is due to the elite’s “monopoly of institutional skills and
access,” which forces non-elites into more informal ways of expressing their sentiment (Scott,
1985, p. 299). In this way, individuals may perform resistance through public conduct, in
writing, and in concert—literally and metaphorically—with other actors. Other times, political
significance is imposed by authorities, thus branding behavior as revolutionary even when such a
motivation is lacking. The process operates in two directions as elites seek to maintain their
control over norms but may inadvertently incite public behavior that is contrary to the norms
they had constructed.
In a similar vein, critical legal studies critiques the conventional view of the origins and
functions of law by presenting it as inseparable from other tools of social control rather than as a
“rationalist and consensual solution to the problem of social order” (Hunt, 1986, p. 6). Legal
systems, then, are not necessarily built on objective rulings but reflect the power dynamics of a
society. The process of “legitimation” draws upon ideological forces to present the current order
as acceptable and sustainable, while often resulting in the “reproduction of human
subordination” (Hunt, 1986, p. 11). Scholars of critical legal studies would therefore be skeptical
of elite claims, such as from President Putin, that laws restricting human rights are fully
justified—in fact, it is possible that they instead have a self-serving purpose. This research will
evaluate the dynamics of cultural and ideological power in Russia with this framework in mind.
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Human Rights and the Law
A central debate in the field of international human rights is whether such rights are
universal or culturally relative. Universalism argues that human rights are inherent to the
individual, and as such is the prevailing viewpoint in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) (Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens, 2007). That is not to say that rights cannot or
should not be encoded into law—in fact, this often guarantees their fulfillment by the state.
However, universalism emphasizes that the law itself, including social customs, is not the source
of rights. Cultural relativism claims that rights are instead “culturally or historically defined”
(Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens, 2007, p. 8). As such, they can and will change over time. A
brief example illustrates the tension between universalism and cultural relativism.
Chinese government officials and scholars have posited the existence of “Asian values”
as an alternative to a universal view of human rights (Callaway in Callaway and HarrelsonStephens, 2007, p. 112). The central claim is that because of the “unique features” of Asian
culture, economic, social, and cultural rights (ESCRs) are given precedence over civil and
political rights (CPRs) (Callaway in Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens, 2007, p. 112). As such,
any effort to impose a ‘Western’ standard of human rights by promoting rights pertaining to the
individual is branded as imperialistic. While this argument may hold truth, it does not address the
possibility that leaders may excuse violations of rights that are not consistent with collectivist
values with the purpose of increasing their own personal power. Under a paternalistic structure,
activists face additional difficulty in mobilizing opposition to such actions. As will be detailed in
the following chapters, Russian leaders have made similar arguments.
Debates on the proper role of international human rights notwithstanding, the rights
themselves may be divided into two categories: civil and political rights, and economic, social,
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and cultural rights. This designation arose after the division of the UDHR in the 1970s into two
covenants, each outlining one of the categories. The former set of rights is most relevant to this
paper. Civil and political rights (CPRs) include the right to self-determination, the right to a fair
trial, and freedom of speech, among others. Some scholars have identified CPRs as “firstgeneration” rights—they must be “realized first” in order to provide for the fulfillment and
enjoyment of other rights (Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens, 2007, p. 6).
States, under international law, have a special duty to fulfill human rights. Each state
must “avoid depriving a person of some necessity,” “protect them from deprivation,” and “aid
them when deprived” (Beetham in Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens, 2007, p. 12). This
approach to human rights places less of an emphasis on the type of right that is to be fulfilled
than on the means and intent of fulfillment. As such, a state that fails to carry out any one of
these three tasks has, indeed, failed to fulfill the human rights of its citizens. At this point, the
state in question may be eligible to receive sanctions from other states that have also signed onto
the covenants. Regardless of whether a state ascribes to a more universal or cultural relativist
stance, these duties stand.
However, the extent of this duty depends on the boundaries of a human right, which may
not always be clearly discernable. Though, from a moral absolutist position, there would be no
cases in which a right may be restricted, reality allows for a more flexible view. The exact nature
of this restriction can vary, but international law sets forth standards for determining its validity.
For instance, freedom of speech and expression may be limited in a state of emergency. When
these rights are restricted outside of this context, as with the Russian hooligan laws, one must
evaluate appeals to cultural and legal norms in the light of international standards. Using these
parameters, scholars, activists, and other figures can elucidate the illegitimacy of the hooligan
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laws as tools of violating civil and political freedoms. Popular resistance, then, may signal a real
violation of rights concealed by distorted appeals by those in power.
Methodology
The template for the structure of this paper is derived loosely from that used by James
Scott, as he illustrates a “landscape of resistance” with a “background,” “middle ground,” and
“foreground” (1985, p. 48). As acts of hooliganism often resemble theatrical performances of
sorts, the image of the stage is symbolically—and in the case of Pussy Riot, literally—realized.
The background is that which is taken as a “given” that is “rarely, if ever, noticed” by the
principal actors, which includes historical, political, and economic context (Scott, 1985, p. 48).
More visibly relevant is the middle ground, which includes the “basic social and economic facts”
of the issue at hand, or at the very minimum a “baseline of experienced givens” (Scott, 1985, p.
49). The foreground is the part of the stage that is central to the analysis, which is the “setting for
local experience and activity” (Scott, 1985, p. 49). As the discussion of the legitimacy of the
hooligan laws is primarily a legal one, the foreground for this research is the setting in which this
debate takes place—among the norms and institutions of international law as they relate to
Russian domestic law.
Chapter II, the background of this analysis, includes a broad overview of the
development of the hooligan laws over time and how they have been used to advance elite
interests. The function of this chapter is to provide the historical context necessary to evaluate
the hooligan laws—are they built on long-standing cultural practices, or have they instead been
shaped into an instrument of power? While the term ‘hooligan’ was not historically part of the
Russian lexicon until late in the tsarist era, its eventual usage was inspired by a series of codified
cultural norms, namely the Domostroy manuscripts, and so these are discussed first. Following is
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a description of hooliganism in the tsarist era immediately before the Russian Revolution of
1917, when it was not yet a legal construct but was punished as such.
Acknowledging that the ideological underpinnings of the Soviet Union varied throughout
its short lifespan, this chapter divides the discussion of hooliganism under Soviet rule into
smaller parts. The first of these, covering roughly the period between World War I and World
War II, describes the flux of cultural and political values that accompanied the transition to
communism. Next is the period between the Second World War and the 1970s, which featured a
new synthesis of ideologies that sought to solidify Soviet dominance in society. Due to a lack of
sources available, the section concerning the period immediately before the collapse of the
Soviet Union is shorter than the previous ones. Nonetheless, it was ultimately included for the
sake of continuity. The final section traces relevant policy decisions and official rhetoric from
Yeltsin’s administration to the end of Medvedev’s term. While Putin had been in office during
this span of time, it is his performance in his current administrative term that is the most
troubling, and thus warranted a chapter of its own.
Closing the chapter is a retrospective analysis of the underlying power dynamics
throughout each period of Russian history discussed in the prior sections. Elite or otherwise
powerful groups are identified and their relations to the prevailing legal, political, and moral
structures are discussed. This is done in order to elucidate a sense of continuity between multiple
periods of time and to frame the conception and punishment of hooliganism as a reaction of
elites against conduct that works against their interests.
Chapter III constitutes the middle ground, identifying the key policies, institutions, and
rhetoric that surround hooliganism in present-day Russia. First is a discussion of the cultural and
political context of Putin’s power, taking cues from the themes of autocracy, nationality, and
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orthodoxy. Key sources include public opinion polls and statements by government officials,
Russian Orthodox Church clergy, and others. Care is taken to ensure that while each of the three
factors is discussed separately, they are ultimate presented as overlapping claims that may be
contrary to the lived reality of Russians.
The next section focuses on concrete actions carried out by the Russian authorities to
maintain the dominance of the three influences previously discussed. There are three broad goals
of these policies and other administrative actions: controlling the public, creating alternative
institutions and legal barriers, and countering foreign influence. Many of these measures were
initiated during Putin’s first administrative term and carried on through Medvedev’s term, some
representing a reversal of the democratic reforms of Yeltsin’s term.
Having set the context of power dynamics today, the chapter proceeds by identifying
who, exactly, has been targeted by the hooligan laws. The section begins by highlighting relevant
portions of the Russian Criminal Code, including Article 213 itself, which details the
requirements for an act to be considered hooliganism. Those individuals and groups most likely
to receive charges of hooliganism include political dissidents and social deviants. There is a
subsection dedicated to examples of each. Concluding the section is a discussion of cases in
which acts that would otherwise be considered hooliganism are ignored entirely, such as
instances of violence against LGBTQ+ individuals.
Hooliganism is not to be equated with generalized discontent against the Putin regime,
though it may appeal to such sentiment. In order to make this distinction, Chapter III closes with
a discussion on popular dissent in Russia broadly, as expressed through public opinion polls and
the emergence of pro-Western individuals and groups. The main catalysts include economic
uncertainty and corruption in politics. How successfully this discontent is channeled can prove to
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have a major impact on the future policy directions of Russia, and, furthermore, will determine
the fulfillment of human rights such as speech and expression.
In weighing the hooligan laws against relevant international law standards on free speech
and expression as well as Russian domestic law, Chapter IV forms the foreground of the paper.
Its goal is to move beyond a normative stance, that is, one that is sympathetic to democratic
norms on principle, and argue the illegitimacy of the laws on a firmer ground. The introduction
to this chapter expresses a sense of urgency that reflects and expands upon the dangers to civil
and political rights in Russia mentioned in the introduction of this paper.
The first section of the chapter presents the most relevant provisions of international law
to the analysis of freedoms of speech and expression. Such documents include the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Since each of these shares
the same basic norms, much of their wording is also shared. In order to avoid redundancy, there
is also included a discussion of the nuances present in each as well as the different functions of
the governing bodies involved. The section closes with remarks on the duties of states in
protecting the right of speech.
The next section examines in depth the circumstances in which it is permissible or
impermissible for a state to restrict speech and expression. Reiterating the key points from the
previous section, it also describes the potential concerns involved in doing so, i.e. protecting one
right while sacrificing the other. To illustrate these norms at work, a case study of lèse-majesté
laws in Thailand is included, which parallels the controversy surrounding other types of
defamation laws.
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The crux of the paper’s argument is found in the final section of Chapter IV, where the
legitimacy of the hooligan laws is tested against both domestic and international law. It begins by
highlighting the portions of the Russian constitution which outline civil and political rights as
well as express democratic norms. After relevant international standards are reiterated, the
hooligan laws are evaluated in accordance with previous cases of restricted speech, responses
from third parties such as NGOs, and their consistency with democratic norms in general. The
section concludes with a call to repeal the laws based on these criteria.
Concluding the paper will be a chapter summarizing the main themes and arguments in
the study of hooliganism. It includes a brief note on the continued resistance of hooligans such as
Pussy Riot as well as Putin’s recent policy initiatives that could determine the trajectory of
human rights in Russia. To reiterate the importance of the study of hooliganism and Russian
crime in general, several points for future research are suggested. The paper concludes with
speculation as to the future of civil and political rights in Russia during the remainder of Putin’s
term as president. By linking past, present, and future, this research provides a coherent
framework for evaluating the extent of authoritarian governance as evident by specific laws.
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Chapter II: History of Hooliganism
Introduction
In order to fully understand the significance of modern hooligan laws, it is necessary to
consider the historical factors in their development, in other words, the background. While these
laws were not formally codified until the period immediately before the Revolution of 1917, and
only then in response to an already volatile public, the behaviors associated with hooliganism
received both criminal and social punishment. Though the circumstances of each of the time
periods examined in this paper vary, a general pattern emerges in which an elite group seeks to
shape the social text through policy, doctrine, or custom, in order to maintain control over the
public. Thus, hooligan laws are not necessarily firmly rooted in Russian culture but have served
the ends of authoritarianism and elite interests in the regimes where they are present.
Hooliganism in the Tsarist Era
Hooliganism was not a homegrown, wholly Russian concept, but rather one that deeply
resonated with existing cultural norms and took on a distinctive Russian character. The word
“hooligan,” in fact, was an early 20th century import from England, where it was a derogatory
term that referred to certain Irish inhabitants of London (Weissman, 1978, p. 228). In tsarist
Russia, the word came to refer to individuals who performed one or more of a variety of social
taboos, ranging from public drunkenness to swearing, without the connotation of ethnic
stereotyping as was present in the English usage.
Under the context of existing social structures and the emerging class tensions brought
about by industrialization, the idea of hooliganism was adopted “as if necessary for the filling of
an empty place, as a broad definition for an entire category of Russian phenomena” (Weissman,
1978, p. 228-229). Beyond the mere disturbance of public order, hooliganism would be infused
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with deeper motivations, both real and imagined, over the course of Russian history as political,
religious, and social leaders sought to maintain hegemony on public morals and behaviors.
Religious Sources
Prior to the introduction of hooliganism to the Russian lexicon, Russian Orthodox Church
leaders set the standards for public and private behavior, condemning many breaches of morality
that would later qualify as hooliganism. For almost 400 years, documents produced by synods—
assemblies of clergy—and through the recording of oral knowledge instructed the faithful on
proper behavior according to their role in society. One such text, the 16th-century Domostroy,
detailed the ‘correct’ order of social relations, such as within a household or between a
household and the tsar. The ultimate goal of this carefully-constructed set of social relations was
the “spiritual aspiration and purification” of the individual believer (Tilk, 2014, p. 130).
Much of the Domostroy addresses the role of the male head of the household. He is
tasked with obedience to both God and to the tsar, facing punishment from both sources if he
transgressed his role (Tilk, 2014, p. 133). The text lists the qualities of a man who has failed in
his worldly and spiritual duties (Tilk, 2014, p. 133):
“He, who in his insolence is not afraid of God and doesn’t follow his will, does not obey
the Christian law and the orders of fathers, does not think about church, chorals, laws of
the monks, prayers and praising the Lord but instead eats and drinks constantly as a glutton
and a drunk and does not obey the rules of the common life…who is misconduct, Sodomlike, does all kinds of indecent deeds: lechers, curses, swears, sings songs that please Satan,
dances and skips, plays the pipe and other devilish instruments, who longs for bears, games
and dogs, organises horseracing – all this is devilish and impudent.”
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By engaging in these behaviors, the head of the household risks tarnishing the public image of
the household as a whole. As an additional source of punishment, individuals would be subject to
public mockery and restricted participation in sacraments (Tilk, 2014, p. 135, 141).
Hooliganism and the Law
It is notable that while hooliganism was recognized as a social phenomenon, it was not
recognized as a distinct legal offense until the Soviet era. This did not prevent the term’s usage
prior to its codification into law. In St. Petersburg in 1906, then considered a hub for street
activity and crime, 104 out of 1000 convictions were for hooliganism (Smith, 1998, p. 175-176).
What prompted the grouping of seemingly disparate crimes such as petty thievery and physical
assault, Neuberger claims, was the “way in which the crimes were perceived” by elites (1989, p.
178). During a time of rapid industrialization and the emergence of revolutionary resentment, the
hooligan “crystallized fears among the respectable classes,” that is, both political figures and the
upper socioeconomic classes (Smith, 1998, p. 175). Such elites described this state of affairs as a
“new urban blight” that included public performances of drunkenness, obscenities, and sexually
deviant behavior—all of which they considered insulting to their cultural hegemony (Neuberger,
1989, p. 177).
Perhaps the most enabling factor in socially deviant street behavior was the excess of
drink. This was not a new phenomenon in Russian society. In 1906, Tsar Alexander II noted an
epidemic of “debauchery, depravity, and especially drunkenness” among the inhabitants of St.
Petersburg (Smith, 1998, p. 175). As is noted in the Domostroy, drunkenness is not only seen as
a personal vice but also a sign of familiar disorder that is not meant to leave the house and
present itself in public (Tilk, 2014, p. 135). Using the logic of the text, this internal disorder
signified one’s ignorance of one’s place in society and was thus an affront to God and the tsar
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himself, to which all households are bound to serve. Public drunkenness also brought with it
threats of violence. Though these were often “more shocking than physically threatening,” they
carried with them an inherent disregard for the status quo (Neuberger, 1989, p. 184).
Drunkenness also brought about the use of obscene language, most of which was directed
against religious and political authorities. Smith points out the linguistic similarities between the
Russian word for ‘mother,’ ‘мать’ (mat’), and the word for obscene language, ‘мат’ (mat)
(Smith, 1998, p. 169). As such, swearing was a way to cast embarrassment or shame onto those
who warranted respect, exposing class tensions. Upper class Russians, ranging from the learned
intelligentsia to church leaders, perceived swearing as a hallmark of the common people who
were “ignorant, immoral, uncivilized and potentially dangerous” (Smith, 1998, p. 170). At the
very least, such speech was unwelcome in the public sphere. At the very worse, its use was a
sign of decaying moral standards.
Sexually deviant behavior would also be categorized as hooliganism. This is unique in
the sense that most other offenses, including drunkenness and swearing, were attributed
exclusively to males. As a “language of power and assertion,” mat was not considered accessible
to women, who occupied a subservient position (Smith, 1998, p. 176). Furthermore, the
perception and expectations of women as moral creatures prevented them from drinking
publicly, or at least not without bringing great shame to themselves and their families (Tilk,
2014, p. 138). Women were often instead associated with prostitution. Though not labelled as
hooliganism per se, female prostitution was presented by the printed media as the moral and
social equivalent of male hooliganism (Neuberger, 1989, p. 185). More often than not, prostitutes
were portrayed in their relation to male companions, who acted as their pimps or encouraged
them to accompany them in performing acts of hooliganism (Neuberger, 1989, p. 185).
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Though displays of homosexuality would be considered sexual deviancy in the Soviet
Union and thus be classified as a hooligan crime, such behavior was not publicly acknowledged
in the tsarist era. Religious texts implicitly condemned homosexuality, as shown in the
Domostroy, which included “Sodom-like” conduct in its listing of unacceptable behavior for a
pious Orthodox man (Tilk, 2014, p. 133). Given this religious taboo, there is little information
about the perception and treatment of homosexuality prior to the creation of the Soviet Union.
Class Tensions
Though the actions of hooligans did not have overtly political messages or motivations,
Neuberger claims the existence of a deeper class struggle. Offenses against the middle and upper
classes were indicative of a conflict over “distribution of power, which after all is the object of
politics” (Neuberger, p. 193). In fact, this is what differentiated them from muggers and other
street thugs who were motivated instead by material incentives (Neuberger, 1989). The notion of
“politics,” then, is appropriately extended to the clash between the working classes and the
middle or upper classes over cultural dominance as well as the need for a “cultural selfdefinition” (Neuberger, 1989, p. 193). Hooligans in the late 20th century and early 21st century
would adopt more clearly political agendas in their quest for self-definition in response to
authoritarian power.
Hooliganism before the Russian Revolution in many ways resembled a public
performance directed mainly at the middle and upper classes. This interaction between
subversive messages and a common space would characterize later acts of hooliganism such as
Pussy Riot’s Punk Prayer. While the messages themselves may change, the medium is not new.
The hooligans of Nevskii Prospekt in the years leading up to the revolution, for example, struck a
blow to elite tastes by appropriating the bridge’s status as the “symbol and measure of the
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civilization of the Russian Empire” (Neuberger, 1989, p. 188). Since Nevskii Prospekt was a
space otherwise dedicated to the consumption habits of the elites, with shops lining the streets,
the entry of the lower classes was seen as an invasion of sorts (Neuberger, 1989). During an
especially newsworthy series of incidents in May 1905, two drunken men harassed passersby,
threatened physical violence to women and children, and made liberal use of obscenities
(Neuberger, 1989, p. 188). Deliberately targeting the respectable patrons of the street, these men
set up a captive audience for their performance that temporarily redistributed power.
Immediately prior to the revolution, hooliganism took on a new gravity as those who
traditionally held power in society felt their vice grip over public behavior loosen. One of the
tactics that elites used in the attempt to regain power over the social text was to formally define
hooliganism. After 1905, the reactionary Under Minister for the Interior Maklakov introduced
“provisional measures” to counter hooliganism (Glisic, 2016, p. 205). This decision was made, in
part, to curb the influence of the futurists—political dissidents with a flair for the avant-garde.
Appearing in public in “clownish outfits” and publishing a manifesto entitled Slap in the Face of
Public Taste, which called for the abandonment of conventional cultural mores, they represented
a direct threat to the values of the tsarist order (Glisic, 2016, p. 201-202). The futurists prefigured
the eventual death of the Russian Empire and the identity-seeking angst of the Soviet Union,
which likewise sought to distance itself from a feudal past.
In 1913, a commission organized by the Ministry of Internal Affairs produced a working
definition for hooliganism: "whatever form reckless violence takes—beating of the first passerby, theft of property, arson, or even murder…can be considered hooliganism” (Weissman, 1978,
p. 229). By placing anything from recklessness to murder on the same moral plane, the Russian
authorities sought to send a clear—and desperate—message that any form of resistance to the
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established social order was not to be tolerated. As the Revolution of 1917 would suggest, such
measures would not prove to be sufficient in maintaining public control. Though the vestiges of
tsarist rule were cast off for a new socialist experiment, and the traditional cultural elites were
eliminated and replaced, the hooligan lived.
Developing a Soviet Culturedness
A clash of cultural values under a new guise also survived the Revolution. Before the
beginning of the Second World War, new Soviet institutions sought to redefine dominant cultural
values through policy. Under the New Economic Policy (NEP), undertaken from 1921 to 1928,
Soviet officials adopted a paradigm of “cultural construction” that was “centred (sp.) on literacy,
education, scientific and institutional development” (Konecny, 1996, p. 97-98). Accompanying
this was an emphasis on ‘kul’turnost’’ or ‘culturedness’ which sought to present the public
sphere as a “universal realm” requiring its own specific decorum (Konecny, 1996, p. 98). Much
of this would be enforced through institutions known as comrades’ courts, which relied on
socially-sanctioned shame as a way to correct deviant behavior. These will be discussed in detail
after a closer look at Soviet cultural pressures.
A New Hooliganism
Though cultural norms were in flux, the hooligan remained as a socially subversive
figure. Smith notes that, between 1922 and 1926, the number of hooliganism convictions
increased tenfold, with most of these directed at working-class young men (Smith, 1998, p. 195).
Such a development seems unusual since Soviet ideology claimed to embrace the working class.
It was because of the specific actions of these men that they were subsequently branded as class
enemies. The new idea of Soviet culturedness asserted the primacy of values such as “smartness,
discipline, training and self-organization,” all of which were deemed necessary in creating a truly
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classless society (Smith, 1998, p. 194). Hooligans who publicly mocked these values with
drunkenness, violence, and general debauchery, then, exemplified a moral deficiency. They
were, according to one Soviet official, no more than “petty-bourgeois mongrels” (Smith, 1998, p.
194).
During this time, a new metaphor arose to explain deviant behavior, focusing on the
corpus of political and social life as opposed to spiritual devotion. Under the materialistic
ideology of the Soviets, hooliganism needed to be redefined in such a way that reflected this
shifting focus. Academics and authorities saw hooliganism as an “epidemic” and an “infection”
that “threatened the health of the Soviet body politic” (Konecny, 1996, p. 106) (Smith, 1998, p.
195). The ‘doctors’ were not legal experts, but rather sociologists and Communist Party elites.
While the former emphasized the impact of “uncontrolled social and political change,” especially
during the 1920s, the latter attributed deviant behavior to a “disintegrating society” and a
“decaying youth morality” (Konecny, 1996, p. 106). These theories echoed the anxieties of the
pre-Revolutionary upper classes as the appearance and performance of morally decrepit bodies
seemed to threaten their dominant status.
To reflect both the collectivist sentiments of the Soviet regime and the preeminent views
of hooliganism as a phenomenon that could be countered socially, new legal documents
redefined hooliganism accordingly. This marks one of the earliest attempts to formally codify
hooliganism into Russian law as a crime. Past efforts only suggested working definitions with
little effect on policy. In 1922, the Soviet Law Code described hooligan acts in Article 176 as
“mischievous, pointless actions, entailing manifest disrespect for individual citizens or society as
a whole” (Smith, 1998, p. 195). The law was amended in 1924 to emphasize offenses against
“public order” (Smith, 1998, p. 195).
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Compared to previous Russian social codes, this definition reflected an emerging
perception of hooliganism as a political act, namely as one that threatens the Soviet regime’s
ability to engineer consent to its governance. It would remain in place in some form up through
the present Russian Criminal Code, giving credence to the increasing primacy of punishing
hooliganism as a political act. Also notable is the legal acknowledgement of maintaining public
order as the primary goal of preventing hooliganism. Though international law norms that allow
suppression of political speech for this end were not yet in existence, it is unclear whether Soviet
law would have been in compliance.
Comrades’ Courts
A curious form of enforcement emerged in the form of comrades’ courts, which relied on
social pressure from peers and neighbors to shame hooligans out of their perturbed condition.
These institutions were present on every university campus in order to combat the behavior
brought about by a “bohemian” student environment (Konecny, 1996, p. 109-110). Though each
followed a set of established legal procedures and principles, the courts did not have the legal
power to punish individuals charged with hooliganism. They instead served as a way to publicize
and critique the underlying values of an individual’s actions (Konecny, 1996). Following a trial,
the case would be reported in great detail in student newspapers (Konecny, 1996).
Comrades’ courts would expand their reach beyond university campuses and into the
community at large over the following decades until the collapse of the Soviet Union. The
importance of non-legal or quasi-legal pressures as well as media coverage would persist as
themes shaping public opinion in regards to hooliganism. Under the watchful eyes of the state,
any deviation from an acceptable public character could earn punishment—that is, insofar as the
public considers it worthy of punishment.
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A Moral Mission
After the Second World War, the Soviet Union sought to cement national values by
distancing itself from its imperial past and embracing a new socialist order. Much of this effort
included a more intrusive look into the private lives of citizens and the attribution of disorderly
public behavior to a private issue. Either problem could allegedly be solved through the
inculcation of collectivist ideals. When this process proved null, the state could order punishment
by prison or by psychiatry, as illustrated in the campaigns against public rowdiness in the 1950s.
This matter will be discussed alongside an evaluation of the sociological explanations of such
behavior.
An editorial in the newspaper Izvestia captures the spirit of the times (Selvinsky &
Selvinsky, 1955, p. 308):
Soviet law regards hooliganism as a crime and punishes those who are guilty. But it is of
the utmost importance that this antisocial phenomenon should be forestalled and that those
who violate the rules of our way of life should be called to order in good time…But
administrative and prohibitionary measures alone are, of course, in sufficient. The struggle
against hooliganism, in particular among young people and adolescents, should be carried
out by the entire public.

The modus operandi of a reinvigorated Soviet society, then, was a strategic integration of social,
legal, and political pressures—the ideological sectors—which had operated independently in the
past. The coordination of responses from these pillars of society would prove to be more
effective in maintaining hegemony over both law and norms.
Punishing Hooliganism
Hooligan charges skyrocketed: from 1947 to 1956, the number of convictions rose from
40,000 to roughly 200,000 (Gorlizki, 1998, p. 410). With courts’ dockets filled to the brim with
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allegations of relatively minor offenses, comrades’ courts made their return in the late 1950s.
Previously exclusive to university campuses and other educational institutions, comrades’ courts
were adopted by the traditional court system to fulfill a dual purpose: to reaffirm the importance
of social organizations in a socialist state and to reduce the costs and efforts accrued by
implementing such efforts (Gorlizki, 1998). Rather than students, the membership of comrades’
courts consisted of panels delegated by housing and work collectives. These were ideal
candidates for promoting an image of “popular justice” due to their essential roles in society at
large (Gorlizki, 1998, p. 403). Punishments, in the most severe cases, included imprisonment up
to eight years or compulsory labor (Werth, 1961, p. 63). By 1964, Russia hosted nearly 90,000
comrades’ courts (Gorlizki, 1998, p. 403).
One of the factors that contributed to the success of the comrades’ courts was the “open
and public nature of hearings” (Gorlizki, 1998, p. 422). Given the cultural and political
expectations of the time emphasizing collective accountability, social shame was an especially
injurious punishment. Much like in the comrades’ courts of universities, the court proceedings
would be described in great detail in local newspapers (Gorlizki, 1998). However, these
newspapers also published details beyond those which were relevant to the case, such as family
troubles (Gorlizki, 1998). This intrusion into an offender’s private matters sparked a new legal
debate.
Some legal scholars argued that, since hooliganism was the fault of deeper social
conditions, it was necessary to expose an individual’s private life and to expand the legal
definition of hooliganism to include domestic misconduct. Through the 1950s, hooliganism only
included offenses “committed in enterprises, offices and in public places” (S., 1956, p. 350). As
such, when a case emerged in which a woman was attacked by her husband with a knife and acid
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for trying to divorce him, the Public Prosecutor remarked: “This is a family business…in which
we are not to interfere. People quarrel and are reconciled again” (S., 1956, p. 350). Councillor of
Justice Paston attributed this failure of justice to a “strict observance of the letter of the law” (S.,
1956, p. 350).
In other words, though the Soviet legal system had made strides to codify certain criminal
behaviors into the law, there remained certain cultural barriers to the state’s intervention in
private affairs, regardless of the level of violence or disorder that they may display. This is likely
due to the lingering influence of the Domostroy and other medieval texts, which assert that the
affairs of a household are private matters to be addressed by the head of the household. The
husband, then, would retain a control over his wife’s morality. Under this context, the actions of
the previously mentioned husband would be justified—he is simply performing his social duty.
Without this context, however, he would be perpetuating the oppression of a weaker group in
society, much like the hooligan laws themselves. Despite the support of an expanded definition
from legal authorities and due to this inherently discriminatory attitude, no such modification
was made.
Though hooliganism remained a crime exclusive to the public sphere, Soviet sociologists
in the 1950s and 1960s turned their attention to a previously ignored factor in explaining its
causes: family upbringing and the presence or absence of parents. This discourse focused mainly
on adolescent and young adult hooligans, 68% of which were reported to have lost one or both
parents—a situation known as an “incomplete family” (Connor, 1970, p. 288). The fathers of this
generation of children likely fought, and possibly died, in World War II. Indeed, 55% of the
young hooligans had lost their father exclusively (Connor, 1970, p. 288). Soviet sociologists
considered these “incomplete” families, as well as “under-supportive” families in which both
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parents worked out of economic necessity, a possible origin of delinquent behavior (Connor,
1970, p. 288-289).
Besides sociologists, medical doctors also took the issue of diagnosing the Soviet body
politic into their own hands, linking morality, psychology, and sexuality. Werth notes the
influence of Dr. T. S. Atarov, who published a book entitled Problems of Sexual Education
which instructed young people as to the dangers of a ‘bourgeois’ approach to personal health and
wellbeing (1961, p. 146). The bulk of Werth’s analysis of the book goes beyond the scope of this
paper, but he nonetheless offers observations that substantiate the role of social pressures in the
Soviet public. Dr. Atarov explicitly denounces drunkenness, especially in the presence of or
involving children or adolescents, which he claims leads to sexual deviance and a violent nature
(Werth, 1961, p. 150). Dr. Atarov also condemns bad language: “Such dirty words… distort the
understanding of the proper relations between men and women. Hence an immoral attitude to
things, and immoral actions” (Werth, 1961, p. 150).
In order to quell such influences, Dr. Atarov calls for the wielding of public opinion, not
necessarily the law (Werth, 1961, p. 150). That is not to say that legal pressures are unneeded,
but rather that the social pressures are crucial in ensuring a cessation of moral decay. His
position is consistent with those who turned to comrades’ courts to charge and punish hooligans.
Whereas past authorities of public morality were often religious figures, the new authorities in
the Soviet era sought to explain behavior using nonspiritual means, such as through the field of
medicine. Though the source of the moral diagnosis changed as Russia turned towards a
materialistic ideology, the symptoms of the hooligan disease were largely the same. The cure, as
in the past, was an increased control of public conduct and the intrusion into one’s private life.

30

Failures of the family were seen as indicative of a greater issue: the failure of the Soviet
Union’s “moral mission” to provide an environment conducive to instilling in children
collectivist values and a good work ethic (Connor, 1970, p. 291). With each passing generation,
however, youth would become more psychologically distant from the original ideals of the
Russian Revolution. A shift in the understanding of hooligans as not only working-age adults but
also as young citizens would prefigure the youthful rebelliousness of punk bands today, who
acknowledge and fully embrace those qualities which Soviet society would condemn as morally
depraved.
The Writer-Hooligan
Public drunkenness, blasphemy, and swearing could be considered categories of speech
in their own right, as a performance of values that elites perceive as being contrary to their own
interests. However, it is important to discuss restrictions on political speech as these actions,
previously attributed to a simple disregard for public order, became increasingly politicized.
Nonetheless, the dynamics of control and the politics of reputation remained the same.
Barriers to freedoms of speech and expression in Soviet society gave rise to the figure of
the writer-hooligan, whose offensiveness was begotten by performance in the public intellectual
sphere rather than on the streets. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, though never himself earning the title
of ‘hooligan,’ observed the suppression of writers’ voices in his Letter to the Fourth Congress of
Soviet Writers: “The right of our writers to voice judgements, which are ahead of their time
concerning the moral life of men and society… these rights are neither presupposed nor
recognized” (Dallin & Rice, 1986, p. 86). One such writer, Mikhail Zoshcenko, satirized Soviet
life in Adventures of a Monkey, resulting in disapproval from the Communist Party, which
condemned his work as “hooliganistic” (Swayze, 1962, p. 38). Writers were discouraged from
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altering the public space, even if that space existed in fiction. Nonetheless, their criticisms
proved that their encroachment onto Soviet values through creative works was, indeed, a threat.
Emerging Democracy
During the 1980s, the Soviet Union became increasingly dependent on Western states for
goods ranging from basic necessities to technology (Borrero, 2004). With this came the influence
of Western political values, such as freedom of speech. Some citizens went so far as to equate
the twin goals of economic stability and democracy (Ostrovsky, 2016, p. 76):
“In fact, democracy and sausages were seen as part of one package: once the country had
freedom of speech, sausages and clothes would follow and Russia would invariably turn
into a nice-smelling Western-style country.”

Of course, ‘sausages and clothes’ implied the fulfillment of a minimum standard of decent living,
which was to be coupled with a minimum standard of civil and political rights. Gorbachev would
respond to such requests by loosening Communist Party control over politics, allowing citizens
to take up various administrative roles that were previously barred to non-Party members
(Borrero, 2004). His efforts, however, were not timely enough to satisfy the Soviet public.
As citizens took to the streets, performing demonstrations in the public sphere that openly
condemned Soviet policies, the state of the Soviet Union was tenuous. Its collapse, then, was a
signal that the new Russia was going to be subject to—and characterized by—an unprecedented
level of dissent in the public sphere. Previously suppressed forms of behavior would make a
rejuvenated appearance in the physical and intellectual avenues of this embryonic democracy. As
social values and law adjusted to reflect new political realities, the hooligan, too, would learn to
adapt.
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The Democracy Project
Yeltsin, 1991-1999
For the first time, the streets were literally opened to public dissent in the 1990s. The
Yeltsin administration allowed, at least in Moscow, the presence of meetings, rallies, and
processions—including on Tverskaya, which was the city’s main thoroughfare (Gilbert, 2016, p.
1564). This signified, likewise, the welcoming of the ideas which these demonstrations may
bring into the public sphere. In the meantime, the Yeltsin administration also moved to dismantle
what was left of the KGB and any other mechanisms of the secret police. The FSB, the successor
of the KGB, received backlash for its treatment of suspects of treason by judges themselves, who
deemed their methods as “unconstitutional” (Matthews, 2000, p. 29). Combined with the civil
rights granted by the new constitution, this decision sent a clear message that the days of
relentlessly patrolling public discourse were over—at least under Yeltsin’s watch.
Under this relative loosening of public control, a new kind of hooligan emerged which
had only existed in the shadows of Russian society. Homosexuals, many of them writers or
journalists such as Slava Mogutin, faced charges for the content of their writings. Writing frankly
and thoroughly about his experiences as a gay man, Mogutin received criminal charges for his
publications because of their “glaringly foul language” (Essig, 2014, p. 18). However, in a legal
system where public displays of homosexuality were prohibited and harshly punished, it is likely
that basing the criminality of the publications on the use of obscenities concealed an ulterior
motive (Essig, 2014). As writers could be accused of hooliganism for bringing subversive
political ideas into the public sphere, likewise they were liable to be accused of introducing
subversive social ideas. In this way, they brought to light tensions that have not been openly
addressed.
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Censorship of the media extended beyond writing to television broadcasts. Many assets
previously owned by the Soviet government, including television news outlets, were sold to
Yeltsin’s supporters in a campaign of privatization in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Vlasenko,
2013, p. 74). Because many of these supporters were representatives of financial groups, they
had the agency to fund programming that was in line with their interests and to revoke funds
from programming that was not (Freedom House, 1999). Much of this funding also went towards
political campaigns to suppress dissent. Yeltsin spearheaded the creation of a press ministry
called the Central Election Commission (CEC) in order to “protect” the state from media
influences (Freedom House, 1999). One of its early proclamations was a set of rules against
“agitation” by journalists, which including a prohibition on expressing bias toward one candidate
or the other in a given period of time leading up to an election (Freedom House, 1999).
Broadcasting, then, was restricted in such a way as to avoid conflicting with the interests and
values of the current administration by ensuring that subversive messages receive little to no air
time.
It is a fair point to say that the Yeltsin administration was not quite the paragon defender
of civil rights in a transitioning democracy. Ethnic and religious minority groups, such as the
Chechens, were subject to everyday harassment, increased censorship and scrutiny, and military
action (Freedom House, 1999). Chechen rebel groups received blame for acts of violence such
as bombings in Moscow, which would bring further persecution upon all Chechens (Freedom
House, 1999). Surely, their acts of protest against the Russian government would be considered
affronts to the dominance of Russian elites. However, insofar as these groups were not included
in the discourse of hooliganism, further discussion of their discrimination within and responses
to Russian society warrants a separate study.
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Putin and Medvedev, 2000-2012
Elected in 2000 following a highly corrupt campaign, Putin immediately pursued a policy
of maintaining public order. Citing the need to eliminate corruption and appealing to calls for
economic and political stability, he took measures to restrain the autonomy of business and
political elites as well as that of the media (Freedom House, 2001). Part of this shift in priorities
was inspired by government officials claiming to be speaking for the interests of the common
citizen. Former KGB major Valery Velichko, making this appeal, welcomed the re-emergence of
various bodies, which he calls “special services,” instituted to maintain order: “People now look
to the special services as their saviors. They’re fed up with all the corruption and theft of the
motherland’s resources—they want order” (Matthews, 2000, p. 29).
Upholding public order included eliminating political dissent. As such, the Putin
administration granted wide powers to the FSB—the very institution that Yeltsin had decried. A
former member of the KGB himself, Putin appointed other former officers to key government
posts. These included seven “supergovernors,” who were to head one each of the newly-formed
“super regions,” or federal districts, of the country (Matthews, 2000, p. 29). In addition, the
Security Council of Russia, consisting of the supergovernors as well as the ministers of the
departments of Defense, Interior, and State Security, was given the power of executive authority
in the event of a state of emergency (Matthews, 2000, p. 29). Even when that was not the case,
the newly created executive offices had the advantage of Putin’s support and previous experience
with quelling subversive behavior, making them especially instrumental in silencing journalists.
Swearing, once again, became a crime. Within the first few months of Putin’s first
administrative term, journalist Irina Grebneva had published a transcript of a conversation
between a local governor and a deputy, filled with expletives, which earned her the charge of
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“petty hooliganism” and a week-long jail term (Matthews, 2000, p. 29). This charge was
consistent with laws which banned the use of foul language in written publications (Matthews,
2000). However, many suspected that it was not the word choice used in the publication but
rather its content which incited authorities to punish Grebneva. The conversation that she had
recorded included details about how the two men had planned to fix an upcoming election
(Matthews, 2000). Regardless of the veracity of this publication, the fact that Grebneva had
received punishment demonstrates that such material was not meant for the eyes or ears of the
public, thus allowing a sharer of sensitive information to become a hooligan.
In order to build public trust in government institutions, the Putin administration
embraced a strategy from 2005 forwards of presenting itself as a “champion of social rights
issues” by instituting a number of “national priority projects” (Bindman, 2015, p. 346). These
included programs aimed at improving the standards in healthcare, housing, education, and
agriculture—many of the policy areas that had previously been criticized by Russians themselves
(Bindman, 2015). As such, this new paradigm could be interpreted as a concession to citizens in
the hopes of quelling dissent and engineering consent, regardless of their actual successes. In
turn, any protestors found themselves standing in opposition to what appears to be a benign set
of policies, diminishing their legitimacy.
Another notable institution is the Public Chamber, created in 2005. Though not included
in Russia’s constitution and lacking a defined political function, it acts as a means of stifling
societal dissent by imposing bureaucratic requirements on certain activities deemed contrary to
societal values (Flikke, 2016, p. 105). Though its functions remain unclear, it has been tasked
with acting as a “hub for a collective vision of ‘society’” with which various civil society actors,
including NGOs, may interact (Flikke, 2016, p. 105). As such, its role as a gatekeeper for
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Russian civil society facilitates restrictions on groups with messages that may be antagonistic to
the state. By placing controls on the activities of organizations in the public sphere, much like the
social and legal pressures on individual citizens, Russian authorities are implying that such
groups can also deviate from prescribed norms, thus displaying hooliganistic behavior. This
provides a political basis for the accusations during the current Putin administration against
NGOs, such as Greenpeace, of hooliganism.
In the meantime, there was a significant change in rhetoric among the Putin
administration and political elites toward civil society groups, with a renewed emphasis on
patriotism. Regardless of actual national origin, organizations could be labelled as “unpatriotic”
or even as “tools of foreign governments” (Gilbert, 2016, p. 1556). By doing so, the
administration could equate a specific NGO, for instance, with goals deemed inconsistent with
Russian social values or political interests with a credible threat to national security. Indeed, this
was true in the case of the “spy rock” scandal of 2006, in which 12 NGOs were shown to have
financial connections with a British MI6 agent (Gilbert, 2016, p. 1556). However, this principle
is complicated when the organization in question includes primarily Russian citizens. Though
clearly not agents of foreign governments, they could nonetheless be seen as an affront to
patriotism, making them hooligans of conscience, if not of action.
A Retrospective Analysis
The historical struggle of the hooligan in Russia follows a distinct pattern. Sensing a
potential threat to their dominant place in society or government, a group of political, religious,
or social elites declare a culture war against those who dare to publicly mock their values.
Whether unintentionally or deliberately, these people branded “hooligans” exhibit deviant
behavior—drunkenness, blasphemy, or treachery—that stand contrary to the elites’ notions of
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the ideal Russian. Naturally, this ideal entails a strict adherence to a code of behavior, such as
religious doctrine, with elites receiving exemptions. The composition of the elite group varies
over time, and the methods it uses depend on the unique domestic and international pressures
unique to each time period.
Under the tsarist regime, maintaining cultural hegemony was mainly a task of religious
authorities, whether through direct or indirect means, who aligned with the interests of the ruling
class. This phenomenon aligns well with the ideas of Gramsci as well as with critical legal
studies, which portrays the law as an instrument of elite power, not as an object arbiter of
disputes. The longevity of the medieval-era Domostroy’s influence on the canon of everyday life
attests to a general internalization of its central messages of piety and familial order, creating a
false consciousness that is not consist with the realities of oppression under the tsar. It is clear
that not all Russians followed this code, but mechanisms of social enforcement remained present,
mainly through the public humiliation of households or individuals. This would otherwise
support the argument that society’s control of social deviants, including hooligans, was part of
deep-seated cultural values. Perhaps this was true in the past.
However, the upper class’s push to produce a legal definition for hooliganism, thus
allowing for more systematic enforcement, was likely a response to the emerging revolutionary
sentiment of the lower classes. While public displays or drunkenness and swearing were not
revolutionary acts per se, certain segments of society, such as the futurists, took it upon
themselves to claim the public sphere. Elites were permitted to engage in such behavior
privately—indeed, a cursory reading of Russian literature would produce numerous examples—
but resented the lower classes for doing so, going so far as to describe it as a disease. Academics
in the Soviet era would reuse this analogy.
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The noble elites of the tsarist era would be replaced after the Revolution of 1917 by
Communist Party leaders and sympathizers, including academics and legal experts. Though
having a fundamentally different view of ordering society—one that emphasized collectivist
values conducive to their interpretation of socialism—they curiously concurred that hooliganism
was a crime. All the previous offenses that constituted hooliganism in the tsarist era were
retained. As the Soviet Union sought to define itself, it also had to consciously discard elements
of its Russian roots. The goal of social control shifted from one of maintaining proper spiritual
and familial relations to one of developing a Soviet ‘culturedness.’ When religious authorities—
or the tsar, with powers granted by religious doctrine—no longer dictated these standards, Party
officials had to devise new models of enforcement.
Mirroring the community-based enforcement of social norms outlined in the Domostroy,
comrades’ courts became one of the primary locations for shaping a new set of norms. It was no
mistake that these courts were introduced first on university campuses. Since one of the goals of
the New Economic Policy was to reform education, making it more conducive to the promotion
of collectivist values, it was necessary to monitor the ideas and behavior of young Soviets.
Through a constant process of norm shaping and the publicizing of socially deviant behavior,
comrades’ courts relied on the student body itself to define and punish hooliganism. These young
people, because of their limited memory of life under a tsar, made excellent candidates in a new
social experiment.
The success of comrades’ courts on university campuses was a factor in the decision to
implement them on a larger scale in the 1950s and 1960s. It is true that this was done to reduce
expenses incurred by legal proceedings; however, it may not have been considered a viable
option had it not been proven successful in at least one setting. Notably, the punishments for
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hooliganism intensified or expanded in scope despite no real change in its definition. While
public shaming was still in use, prison sentences up to a few years became increasingly common.
Moving from primarily social to legal pressures marked a certain confidence of Soviet officials.
No longer a new nation and with a more sophisticated structure of governance, the Soviet regime
could now suppress social deviancy more effectively.
During the latter half of the Soviet Union’s lifespan, hooliganism began to overlap with
political dissent and activism. In the past, the crime was considered, for the most part, one of
transgression against social norms. Any political action was implicit or unintentional rather than
explicit. Academic fields, including medicine, began assigning political motives to acts of
hooliganism, labelling such behavior as inherently bourgeois and thus contrary to the proper
functioning of Soviet society. It is not possible to know whether individual hooligans carried out
a burglary or episode of public drunkenness, for example, with this hidden motive. Nonetheless,
academics were correct in sensing an increased politicization of hooliganism. Writers were
among the prime culprits, proving that misbehavior in the public sphere did not include only that
which was performed on the streets. Hooliganism included ideas as well as deeds.
As a democratic regime emerged under Yeltsin, the hooligan received little attention.
However, the brief period of time encompassing his administration set the stage for later
crackdowns on political dissent, despite his active efforts to promote civil freedoms. The
consolidation of media outlets produced new elite figures who had the financial power to
influence Russia’s ideological sectors and public opinion. By Putin’s second administration, the
number of independent media outlets would drop significantly, severely restricting the content
available to the Russian public. Putin, in his first administrative term, would facilitate this
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process by allowing economic elites a prioritized position in developing institutions to maintain
public order. Medvedev’s term would act as a continuation of such policies.
As will be discussed in the following chapter, hooligans will once again find themselves
pitted against a new elite. A new set of values would be made evident in the enactment of
policies that seek to suppress dissent with help from unexpected groups in Russian society. At
the same time, those left out of the process of norm shaping would find themselves gravitating
towards the ideals of Western liberalism. Their numbers have increased over time in response to
perceived failures of the Putin administration. Distancing themselves from the elites, perhaps
some will find a new ally in the hooligan.
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Chapter III: Political Context and Hooliganism in the Present
Introduction
Entering his second administrative term in 2012 after a highly corrupt election, Russian
President Vladimir Putin immediately began the work that he had previously left to Dmitry
Medvedev. A weak leader, Medvedev followed cues from Putin, who served as the Prime
Minister. Since his election, Putin has instituted a series of reforms aimed at suppressing dissent
and consolidating his authoritarian power, leaving Russians with severely limited civil and
political freedoms. Still, hooliganism continues to flourish, and even middle-class Russians are
beginning to speak up against the regime. The objective of this chapter is to examine the cultural,
political, and legal forces which define hooliganism today and to demonstrate how the hooligan
laws are used to silence oppositional voices in Russian society.
Cultural and Political Context
The previous chapter identified the various factors that contributed to the definitions and
perceptions of hooliganism throughout Russia’s history. As such, in order to understand the
function of hooligan laws today, this section will use the same method of analysis. For the sake
of simplicity and consistency, the factors will be discussed in groupings as they relate to Russia’s
goals as asserted by a tsarist era Minister of Public Education: autocracy, nationality, and
orthodoxy (Blinoff, p. 192-193). Many cultural and political factors fall into more than one of
these principles. Indeed, this further serves the point that they are mutually reinforcing and that a
shift in the understanding of one often leads to a similar shift in the others. The Putin
administration has shaped policies according to these historical principles in order to give the
appearance of conceding to public opinion and to gain legitimacy for his authoritarian stance. As
illustrated by the theories of Gramsci and Scott, he has effectively gained control of the
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ideological sectors of Russian society to garner popular consent to policies that are not aligned
with their interests.
Autocracy
A necessary prerequisite to analyzing the role of hooligan laws in maintaining Putin’s
power is the classification of the regime itself. While commonly referred to as authoritarian, it is
more specifically described as a “new authoritarian” regime, in which the leader preserves his
power “while employing relatively little violence against the public,” instead using means of
manipulation and intimidation (Lipman, 2016). Part of this manipulation involves a careful
equation of national values with Putin’s authority. This marks a departure from Soviet era tactics,
which often relied on shows of force to deter and punish political dissent. That is not to say,
however, that government authorities and the police under the Putin administration are violenceaverse—violence is simply no longer the dominant tactic.
At the same time, many political dissidents, far removed from the Soviet era but
possessing a deep knowledge of Russia’s history, have ventured to make connections between
their own treatment and that of their Soviet counterparts. Nadezhda Tolokonnikova, one of the
members of Pussy Riot detained after the performance of Punk Prayer, likened her hearing to a
“mock trial” of the Stalinist age (Smith, 2012, p. 16). The political and intellectual consciousness
of repressive Soviet policies remains in the minds of the public, allowing them to draw parallels
between past and present conditions even when personal experience is absent.
As a continuation of Yeltsin-era policies, media outlets continue to be privatized, with
many of these finding their way into the same few hands. Oligopolistic in nature, media
companies benefit from ties to political elites who limit the content of and access to the news.
For instance, TV executives set forth blacklists of individuals and groups that are not to be
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televised and exclude certain significant events, such as protests, from being covered if they
reflect poorly on the Kremlin (Vlasenko, 2013). There has been a “crowding out” of media in
which certain groups, such as human rights organizations, have faced a “progressive
deterioration in the tones” used to describe them (Gilbert, 2016, p. 1562-1563). In other cases,
media outlets initiate a “broadcast of deliberate misinformation” in order to present an alternate
view of both historical and current events to the public (Vlasenko, 2013, p. 75). The eagerness
with which media executives tailor their company’s messages to the whims of the political elite
demonstrates a symbiosis that reinforces autocracy.
Nationality
The concept of ‘nationality’ as it pertains to Russia’s perceived values does not
necessarily involve its legal definition, that is, the quality imparted by membership in a certain
nation that may include citizenship. It does, however, feature an implicit tie to both ethnicity and
geography. As it will be used in this analysis, ‘nationality’ will refer to the composite of those
traits which are considered to best fit the idea of what a ‘Russian’ should be, as defined by any
one or several social sources. Historically, these traits have been shaped, asserted, and
maintained mostly by religious and political authorities; though, history has also demonstrated
shifts according to the dominant ideologies of the times. When considering the perception,
causes, and motivations of hooligans in Russia today, it is important to identify the major social
forces that criticize them for deviating from the Russian ideal.
Hearkening to the tsarist era, where elites often described Russia as a pious empire with
Moscow as its holy city, Putin has described the Russia he intends to create with language that
glorifies the country’s past. Whether described as a “civilizational mission” or as a “special
destiny,” his vision involves reconstructing the past in order to build a sense of continuity and
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spark national pride (Glisic, 2016, p. 209). Putin’s ascension to the presidency as a strong leader
who maintains a “symbiotic relationship” with Russian Orthodox clergy, under this carefully
constructed campaign, appears to be the “logical” next step (Glisic, 2016, p. 210). The alteration
of history for ideological ends, of course, is more difficult when collective memories of the past
are distant.
However, individuals who retain memories of life in the Soviet Union have made active
attempts to reconstruct the past for themselves. Whether driven by ideology or nostalgia, the
search for a common truth poses an interesting question: will a recollection on this scale prompt
support or opposition for Putin’s vision? Some Russians vividly recall the emergence of
democracy in the 1990s, dubbing it the “era of freedom”—a complex freedom in which there
existed both a “lack of pressure…from the authorities” and “various bans on public activity”
(“Russia’s wild decade,” 2017). When memories tend to be fragmented or generational, there
may be various and competing views on Russia’s trajectory, and this fragmentation may be
reflected in corresponding ideas about how a Russian should act.
As in tsarist times, there is a continuing tension between Russians living in rural and
urban areas as each group perceives its own mode of living as the correct one. Vanden Heuvel
asserts that Russia can be divided along broad cultural, economic, and political lines (2012, p. 5):
One is largely urban, Westernized, secular and modern; the other includes struggling,
industrialized regional cities and towns as well as the country’s rural heartland, where most
people are suffering economically. This other Russia believes it’s guarding the country’s
traditional values and religious convictions.

That being said, each group may have differing opinions on what is considered social or political
dissent and will support policies that align with their views. In drafting policy, then, the
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administration carefully balances the needs of the large urban population and the smaller rural
population, which is among Putin’s strongest sources of ardent supporters.
Though competing views exist on what behavior reflects the values of the ideal Russian,
there is a notable group that is consistently excluded: Russians who identify as LGBTQ+. In fact,
to express homosexuality in any form is considered tantamount to treason. Essig notes that since
sexual deviancy in Russia is seen as a “perversion of the individual,” and that the behavior of
individuals has historically been seen as either an embrace or a rejection of societal values, then
“the pervert was never a patriot” (2014, p. 5). Such an individual is liable to legal and social
punishment. After the ‘gay propaganda’ ban was passed in 2013, harassment of LGBTQ+
Russians greatly increased, with authorities ignoring these incidents or blaming them on the
victims (“License to harm,” 2014). This gives an explanation for the treatment of LGBTQ+
hooligans, whose actions and lifestyles are equated with political treachery.
An integral part of the Russian identity is religion—namely, an adherence to the
traditions of the Russian Orthodox Church. More will be said in the next section about the
Church’s role in influencing Russian politics. Here, its effects on Russian notions of proper
public behavior will receive attention. For instance, Pussy Riot’s Punk Prayer, calling upon the
Virgin Mary to strike Putin down, incited anger among the deeply pious. However, some
appealed not to its insult to God, but rather to a common sensibility. After the band members
received prison sentences, Moscow police chief Vladimir Kolokoltsev personally defended their
harsh treatment (emphasis added): “As an Orthodox man, I consider this performance a spit into
my soul. Its cynicism is an insult to all society, and I consider the actions we took appropriate”
(Antonova, 2012, p. 17). To be Russian is to be Orthodox, and to be Orthodox, in the eyes of
many Russians, requires its own set of political obligations.
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Orthodoxy
In present-day Russia, religiosity is intimately tied to political loyalty, and elites employ
rhetorical strategies to equate the two. Putin’s use of “God talk” in public and official discourse
has signaled a reinvigorated symbiosis between church and state (Young, 2013, p. 43). This
religiously-based speech has also manifested itself in the form of action, as the Putin
administration introduces (or in some cases, reintroduces) clearly religious themes into the public
sphere. For instance, high-profile politicians attend church services and Orthodox priests are
invited to “[bless] everything from spaceships to new prison buildings” (Young, 2013, p. 43).
While the appearance of religious themes and figures in public may not be unusual, it is the
active exclusion and persecution of other religious groups that is an integral part of the
administration’s strategy. This idea will be explored in depth in a forthcoming section.
It is possible that the display of religious values in politics does not reflect popular
attitudes about the separation of church and state but rather functions as a “new ideological prop,
a ‘national idea’ to fill the post-communist void” (Young, 2013, p. 43). After the dissolution of
the Soviet Union, the emerging Russia entered a struggle to redefine itself. This was not a simple
transition, since the country could no longer rely on the canon of communist thought to form its
guiding principles. Since civil and political rights were not fully protected under nascent
democratic institutions, political elites gained the power to shape Russia’s new identity. As was
previously mentioned, Putin has begun a campaign based on nostalgia of Russia’s imperial past,
adopting its ancient moral authorities as the ones that will accompany him in carrying out his
vision.
Religious activity is highly regulated, and the privilege or marginalization of certain
faiths has a legal basis. State documents reaffirm “the special role of Orthodoxy” in conducting
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the country’s affairs and assert a “respect” for Judaism, Islam, and Buddhism (Young, 2013, p.
42). However, other faiths lack such protections—in order for a religious group to be legally
recognized, it has to enter a 15-year “probation period” in which only private services or prayer
meetings are permitted (Young, 2013, p. 42). Groups such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses have faced
both legal and social barriers—their members are often publicly persecuted and harassed
(Young, 2013). As such, one’s physical safety is partly dependent on the expression of one’s
faith.
In fact, the emotions of Orthodox Church members receive special legal protections. In
2017, 22-year old Ruslan Sokolovsky received a jail sentence of just over three years for
recording a video of himself playing mobile game Pokémon Go in a church. He was charged
under Article 148 of the Criminal Code for “insult[ing] the religious feelings of believers,”
which allows up to a one-year prison sentence (“Pokémon Go blogger convicted,” 2017). It is
important to note that, prior to Pussy Riot’s performance of Punk Prayer in a cathedral, no such
law was in place (“Pokémon Go blogger convicted,” 2017). Though Sokolovsky was not charged
with hooliganism, this case demonstrates the preferential legal treatment that members of the
Orthodox Church receive, even if such protections involve restrictions in freedom of speech
based on vague grounds. Such conditions are one reason that the hooligan laws are dangerous to
civil and political rights.
In response to the performance of Pussy Riot as well as other acts of hooliganism, clergy
have utilized a more abstract rhetoric than that used by laypeople. Often, this involves a
judgement of the hooligan’s soul. Echoing the concern of Moscow police chief Kolokoltsev in
regards to the depravity of Punk Prayer, clergyman Vsevolod Chaplin laments: “What they did
was service to the dark forces, and people with pure hearts and minds understand this, it is what
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the entire church feels” (Antonova, 2012, p. 17). By illustrating the problem as one of a spiritual
dissent rather than political or social dissent, clergy assume responsibility for remedying any
wrongs and often do so with the full support of the Kremlin.
Policies and Administrative Action
The tripartite Russian emphasis on autocracy, nationality, and orthodoxy as has, in turn,
been used to enact a series of policies. Much of these are continuations of policies set forth
during Putin’s first administration or Medvedev’s administration. Others were instituted as a
response to the perceived weakness of Yeltsin era policies, often reversing entirely the measures
he had put into place. Generally, the policies set forth during Putin’s second administration were
meant to achieve one of three goals in regulating public activity: controlling the public through
additional restrictions, setting up alternative institutions to build political support, and countering
foreign influence.
Controlling the Public
A number of new policies increased oversight of civil society, especially in response to
the protests of 2011-2012 which were spurred by corruption during the presidential election.
Many of these were proposed during Putin’s first term but have been implemented with greater
deliberation. Among other provisions, the measures included the strengthening of GONGOs
(government-organized non-governmental associations), the creation of the Public Chamber, and
restrictions on the actions of both domestic and foreign-based NGOs (Gilbert, 2016). At the same
time, the administration provided greater monetary and rhetorical support to organizations that
were not political in nature or were openly supportive of the regime (Gilbert, 2016).
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With this oversight structure in place, the Russian government began a general
crackdown on public dissent, targeting both individuals and groups. This was initiated with the
passage of four laws (Vanden Heuvel, 2012, p. 5):
A dramatic increase in financial and criminal penalties for “defamation”; a blacklist, as yet
unpublished, of “harmful” websites; punitive fines on participants in, and organizers of,
“unsanctioned” protests; and legislation mandating that NGOs declare any foreign funding
and, if they accept it, label themselves as “foreign agents.”

Clearly, such laws are contrary to democratic norms and represent a sliding back of personal
freedoms. However, the silencing of dissent would only increase as several new and interlocking
laws were passed to further strengthen the government’s control over public speech and action.
Russian officials and the police have continued a campaign against unsanctioned protests,
that is, those that do not first undergo the bureaucratic process of approval that few pass. This
has included intimidating protestors. In some cases, the police detain and beat participants, even
if they are assembling in a peaceful way (Lipman, 2016). Otherwise, organizers and protestors
could receive a heavy fine of $9,000, which exceeds the average yearly salary of $8,500 (Smith,
2012, p. 17). By imposing both physical and material risks to protesting as well as severely
narrowing the cases in which protesting is allowed, the Russian government is restricting civil
and political liberties to the point where they are nearly nonexistent.
This crackdown culminated in the passage of the Law on Public Control, drafted from
late 2012 to 2013. The Public Chamber deliberately excluded NGOs and other concerned groups
from this process (Flikke, 2016). Only the Russian World Wildlife Fund (WWF) was permitted
to make “short recommendations” for amending the legislation (Flikke, 2016, p. 114). Focusing
on conservation and therefore having an apolitical agenda, the WWF in Russia would not
constitute a likely challenge to regime power, so it is possible that it was selected in place of
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other NGOs for this reason. Excluding all NGOs from the drafting process would raise suspicion
of the law’s true intents. The final product was a set of laws consisting of a “series of
prohibitions and sanction” with “no legally founded definition of public control” (Flikke, 2016,
p. 114).
Though the law originated within the Public Chamber, the presidential administration
wields the legal right to “edit” laws it creates. (Flikke, 2016, p. 114). As such, it means that by
the time the Law on Public Control formally went into effect in 2014, Putin himself had added
several provisions that strengthened his role in its enforcement. The most notable change was the
removal of references to citizens’ constitutional right to manage public control themselves as
well as to international laws and standards (Flikke, 2016). In making these revisions that
wouldn’t otherwise alter or obscure the functions of the law itself, he has implicitly asserted the
primacy of the Russian political elite’s norms regarding control of speech.
The Yeltsin administration attempted to strengthen civil liberties but also saw major
restrictions on access to information as the newly privatized broadcast companies were quickly
bought by economic elites. During Putin’s second administration, the effects of this process
would become even more pronounced. Major media outlets have gone so far as to reorganize
their programming structures, and advertisers have revoked their funding from outlets that
display a stance that is critical to the government (Lipman, 2016). One such independent outlet,
TV Rain, faced a drop from 12 million viewers to 70,000 viewers in 2014 and was forced to
operate solely online after cable TV operators terminated their contracts (Lipman, 2016). It is
important to note that while these private companies are not acting as government entities per se,
they have a significant political and economic incentive to comply. In turn, this greatly narrows
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the scope of the content to which Russian viewers are exposed. Biased information and
misinformation flourish under such conditions.
Censorship extends into cyberspace as well. Many laws governing freedom of expression
on the Internet rely on vague terminology that, much like the laws against hooliganism, allow for
flexibility in interpretation. For instance, a 2012 law calls for websites to be blacklisted and shut
down if content is found to promote suicide, drugs, pornography, or extremism (Vlasenko,
2013). Restricting access to this kind of information seems, at first, to be legitimate from the
standpoint of upholding public health or morals. However, it is the last of these, extremism,
which is used to stifle certain political views which are not necessarily extreme, but rather
contrary to the agenda or previous actions of the Russian government. A report by Human Rights
Watch lists a few possible ‘extreme’ topics: “[T]he occupation of Crimea, criticism or satire
regarding the Russian Orthodox Church, or Russia’s armed intervention in Syria” (“Online and
on all fronts,” 2017, p. 2).
Alternative Institutions and Legal Barriers
When the outright silencing of political and social dissidents brought the risk of domestic
or international censure, the Russian government turned to the creation of alternative institutions
and legal barriers. These measures, sometimes using the rhetoric or methods of democracy,
further solidified the regime’s authoritarianism. In other cases, the government gained the
support of nongovernmental groups such as the Russian Orthodox Church in an attempt to
recapture the public’s trust and counter activism. In taking these steps, the Putin administration is
trying to demonstrate that its own interests are compatible with—or even equivalent to—those of
the public, making it easier to charge and punish individuals such as hooligans.
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In order to increase public trust in the government and to promote the image of
democracy, a procedure was instituted in 2012 to allow citizens to propose laws through
petitions. In order to gain consideration from the legislative Duma, petitions must receive more
than 100,000 signatures (Flikke, 2016). Putin presented the program as a way to check the power
of “image-makers” and “political technologists” in creating government policy (Flikke, 2016, p.
110). This method has had success in creating new laws, such as the Foreign Agents Law of
2012, which will be discussed in depth at a later point. The question remains as to the actual
effectiveness of the petition procedure. Campaigning is based on access to media coverage,
which is heavily regulated and concentrated. While citizens may suggest new laws that run
counter to the regime’s interests, the chances that they will receive the required support are
unlikely.
As a response to the increased prevalence of popular rallies, officials have sponsored
rallies of their own. The “anti-orange rally,” held on February 4, 2012, took place on the same
day as the “For Fair Elections” protest (Gilbert, 2016, p. 1553). In order to counter the public
message of the original protestors, who criticized rampant electoral corruption, the alternative
rally organizers adopted a staunchly pro-government stance (Gilbert, 2016). Protests organized
by regime critics, no matter how large, received no air time. The inverse may also be true: progovernment demonstrations would likely receive more air time. Media companies, in colluding
with government officials, could present a heavily biased version of current events, or exclude
them altogether, in order to shape public opinion in their favor.
Organizers are subject to a heavily bureaucratic process for the proper permissions and
licensing that pro-government bodies do not have to experience. Though this does not constitute
a legal barrier per se, it operates through deliberate policy measures and imposes a significant
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time and cost burden (Gilbert, 2016). Regional variations in regulations on organizing exist,
making activism a formidable challenge in certain parts of Russia. In Moscow, for instance,
human rights groups encounter much difficulty in receiving permissions to organize large public
events (Gilbert, 2016). This is likely due both to the size of the city and its status as the capital—
any public demonstrations will be highly visible. By restricting the loci of speech, regulations
also implicitly restrict speech itself.
The Kremlin is not averse to suppressing political dissent by charging an individual with
a crime that has little to do with political ends. Artyom Loskutov and Taisiya Osipova,
opposition party activists, were charged with allegations of drug abuse despite a lack of evidence
and an outcry from journalists and human rights advocates (Vlasenko, 2013). As a result, they
both faced prison time up to 10 years (Vlasenko, 2013). Given this precedent, it would not be
inconceivable for the Putin administration to use hooligan laws in the same way. Authorities
seeking to quell a certain type of behavior, or to silence a certain group of people, can charge
individuals with hooliganism in order to conceal the fact that they wish to punish another act. In
doing so, they would avoid potential outcry.
Leaders in the Russian Orthodox Church have also had a say in influencing policy with
the goal of shaping public behavior. The Doctrine on Human Dignity, Freedom and Rights,
introduced in 2008, asserted the primacy of the interests of the “Fatherland” above individual
rights (Young, 2013, p. 43). The exercise of such rights also should not challenge the “model of
harmony” that exists between the government and society (Young, 2013, p. 43). Few other
religious groups have made a comparable statement. In fact, part of its text suggests opposition
between religious practice and international human rights norms (“Human rights in Christian
worldview,” 2018):
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[T]he implementation of human rights should not come into conflict with God-established
moral norms and traditional morality based on them. One’s human rights cannot be set
against the values and interests of one’s homeland, community and family. The exercise of
human rights should not be used to justify any encroachment on religious holy symbols
things, cultural values and the identity of a nation.

By equating religious piety with patriotic allegiance, and human rights institutions with the
possibility of impiety, the doctrine prompts believers to be skeptical of foreign influence,
especially in the name of universal values.
Countering Foreign Influence
Closely tied to Putin’s nationalistic rhetoric is a distrust of foreign institutions, including
domestic organizations perceived to have connections to foreign powers. In the eyes of the
current regime, such outside pressures constitute enough of a threat to the ideals of Russian
nationality and identity to warrant a policy response. As such, one of the major strategies of the
Putin administration’s policies involves countering or eliminating sources of foreign influence.
One of the types of institutions that receives the most scrutiny is NGOs. While both
domestic and foreign-based NGOs are subject to legal barriers, the latter experience a greater
extent thereof. In recent years, Russian civil society has experienced a substantial growth in both
the number and range of NGOs, prompting a more firm stance from political elites. Near the
beginning of Putin’s second administrative term, about 650,000 NGOs existed, encompassing
both political and nonpolitical concerns (Zakaria, 2011). In order to mitigate their activities,
authorities have charged many NGO activists, such as the Greenpeace’s Arctic 30, with
hooliganism.
Foreign NGOs face an additional layer of restrictions through the Foreign Agents Law.
Enacted in 2012, the law requires all foreign-funded NGOs to register as foreign agents, allowing
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the government to conduct inspections of their activities as they see fit (Vlasenko, 2013). It is
notable that this law was initially suggested through an Internet campaign with the slogan “you
have a right to know” as a part of Putin’s initiative to allow citizens to propose new laws (Flikke,
2016, p. 110). As of 2016, the Russian Ministry of Justice has identified 77 organizations as
foreign agents (Gilbert, 2016, p. 1573). This list is available on the Ministry’s website.
Publicizing this information is a deliberative move to marginalize such organizations,
considering the “strong social stigma” that the label carries (Gilbert, 2016, p. 1573). While the
Foreign Agents Law is most certainly a tool of authoritarianism, the Putin administration can use
the fact that it has received widespread public support to defend both its intent and methods.
Closely related to the Foreign Agents Law is the 2015 ‘undesirable foreign organizations’
law, or, more colloquially, the ‘undesirables’ law. The Foreign Ministry can identify
organizations deemed to be a threat to national security and prohibit them from operating in
Russia (Gilbert, 2016). In addition, all other organizations in Russia are ordered to cut off contact
with any blacklisted organizations (“Online and on all fronts,” 2017). These measures severely
restrict NGOs working within Russia from relying on resources or guidance from outside
sources. Putin’s nationalistic rhetoric further directs the public view of foreign organizations,
causing part of the pressure against them to be exerted by the citizens themselves.
Many of the ‘undesirable’ organization are currently “American democracy promotion or
civil society capacity-building organizations” which have provided funding to similar groups in
Russia (“Online and on all fronts,” 2017, p. 16-17). It is dubious to claim that such organizations
pose significant threats to Russia’s national security, but perhaps they do pose threats to the
authoritarian regime’s existence. This coupling of security with regime survival can breed a
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sentiment of complicity as the public is persuaded to accept the decay of their civil and political
rights as necessary.
The Russian government often associates certain groups with foreign, specifically
Western, intrusion. The most common of these include not only organizations receiving foreign
funding but also liberal activists and gays (Lipman, 2016). As was discussed previously, the
Kremlin views these groups as subversive to Russian patriotism and, in some cases, as threats to
national security. As such, pro-democracy advocates and LGBTQ+ Russians or those perceived
as living lifestyles contrary to Russian ideals also face restrictions according to the laws
governing the activity of foreign agents, even if they lack such an affiliation. When considering
the charges of hooliganism brought against homosexual journalists or Greenpeace activists, for
instance, it is important to keep in mind this context.
Who Is Targeted?
Through policies designed to suppress civil society and alliances with key cultural and
religious figures, the Putin administration has made it clear that enemies of the regime, including
hooligans, deserve harsh punishment. The guidelines for the classification and punishment of
crime are outlined in the Russian Criminal Code. Besides the legal designation, hooligans today
may be classified as political dissidents or social deviants, with varying degrees of overlapping
qualities. In examining how these laws function, it is also important to note actions that, in any
other context, would be considered hooliganism but are ignored on account of a particular
quality of the victim. The consistency with which the laws are enforced may give clues as to
whom the regime perceives as threatening its interests.
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Hooligan Laws and the Criminal Code
Chapter 3 of the second section of the Russian Criminal Code outlines the concept of
crime and the categories of crimes punishable by law. Article 14 defines crime as a “socially
dangerous act, committed with guilt and prohibited by this Code under threat of punishment.”
The document gives no guidelines for what may be considered a socially dangerous act, allowing
for a broad interpretation. This fact alone is not necessarily worthy of concern since many legal
codes intentionally include vague language in order to allow for changes in social norms.
However, the latter half of the definition is suspect. Later articles in the Criminal Code detail the
conditions necessary for guilt, which includes a full understanding of the possible social danger
that may entail from the act, not the realized social danger after the act has been committed.
Combined with the lack of definition of social danger, this provision allows authorities to punish
individuals or groups according to the social danger that they subjectively perceive, likely
serving the preservation of authoritarian power. According to critical legal studies, this is a
predictable feature of legal tools serving authoritarian leaders as they are crafted and
implemented in such a way as to reinforce their power.
Article 15 outlines the categorization of crimes as follows: crimes of little gravity, crimes
of average gravity (or medium-gravity crimes), grave crimes, and especially grave crimes. These
are differentiated by the degree of intentionality involved in the crime as well as the maximum
penalty for committing the crime. The two most relevant categories to the analysis of
hooliganism are crimes of little gravity and medium-gravity crimes, for which the maximum
time in prison is three years and five years, respectively. Few charges of hooliganism result in a
prison sentence longer than these periods of time. However, it is common for individuals to be
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charged with multiple crimes at once, such as extremism or drug possession, causing the
individual to spend several years in prison despite the low gravity of their separate crimes.
Provisions for identifying and punishing hooliganism are located in Article 213. Here,
hooliganism is defined as a “gross violation of the public order manifested in patent contempt of
society” and accompanied “by the use of weapons or articles used as weapons” or “by reason of
political, ideological, racial, national, or religious hatred” as committed by an individual or
group. For an individual, penalties include fines roughly equivalent to 2-3 years’ salary, up to
480 hours of obligatory labor, or a term of compulsory labor or prison sentence up to five years.
For groups, penalties for each convicted person include fines roughly equivalent to 3-4 years’
salary, a term of compulsory labor up to five years, or a prison sentence up to seven years. As
such, acts of hooliganism committed as a group are considered crimes of greater gravity than
those committed by individuals. In order to understand why Russian law considers certain acts to
be grave, it is necessary to first identify instances of these acts.
Political Dissidents
Capturing the world’s imagination, the feminist punk collective Pussy Riot has become
the quintessential portrayal of the hooligan. Its members, varying in number but united in
ideology, are known for colorful and evocative performances that shed light on the political and
social issues of Russia today. In 2012, the band performed the 40-second Punk Prayer in front of
the altar of Christ the Savior Cathedral in Russia, in which they called upon the Virgin Mary to
“drive away Putin” and identified the “chief saint” of the country as the “head of the KGB”
(Tayler, 2012). The religious symbolism and heavy use of expletives prompted an outcry from
the Russian Orthodox Church, whose clergy condemned the acts as “blasphemous” (Vanden
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Heuvel, 2012, p. 5). For their performance, they were charged with hooliganism, blasphemy, and
other crimes and were sentenced to two years in a penal colony.
The group has chosen to take a broad political stance, decrying the close connections
between Russian Orthodox clergy and Putin and aligning itself with feminist, LGBTQ+, and
environmentalist activists (Bashir & Fedorova, 2015). While on trial for Punk Prayer, members
defended their actions by claiming that the cathedral was “not a church but a commercial
enterprise because of businesses that operate there” (Kishkovsky, 2012, p. 19). Elsewhere, they
have expressed a similar skepticism of church-state relations, stating that “for [Russia] to have a
church which is now serving the KGB is a crime” (Dawson, 2018, p. 16). That being said, while
Punk Prayer certainly contains a strong message against the collusion between political and
religious elites for the suppression of freedoms of speech, it is not indicative of a single message.
Instead, this specific performance is a part of a generalized opposition toward “the total control
over traditional media by conservative state institutions” (Bashir & Fedorova, 2015, p. 133-134).
Much like the Russian futurists of the early 20th century who, in a time of prerevolutionary turmoil, mocked the values of the elite through their choice of attire, manner, and
stage, the case of Pussy Riot also involves a deliberate subversion of the public sphere. Donning
brightly-colored dresses and masks, the band members became anonymous Russian citizens,
expressing dissent outwardly that many express inwardly. Part of their performance involved
dancing and gesturing, including prostrating before the altar of the Cathedral, suggesting a
parody of the behavior of Russian Orthodox clergy (Tayler, 2012). To complete the effect, the
act was recorded up to the point where it was shut down by security guards, showing that the
intent was for the performance to be shared widely. To simply dismiss the actions of Pussy Riot
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as blasphemy would be to miss the point of the performance—it mocks clergy and believers not
for their piety, but their devotion to the false idol of authoritarian rule.
It is not only individuals but also groups and formal organizations which may be targeted
for political activism. According to the Russian Criminal Code Article 213, a group may be
subject to hooliganism charges based on the actions of its members. For this reason, the actions
of NGOs are subject to close scrutiny—especially if they act in a way contrary to the Kremlin’s
interests. Legal mechanisms such as the Foreign Agents Law of 2012 and the ‘undesirables law’
put further restrictions on NGOs under the pretense that they are operating in accordance with
the wishes of a foreign government.
One of the most notable instances of an NGO being charged with hooliganism involves
the Arctic 30, a group of protestors and ship crew members backed by Greenpeace. Traveling
aboard the Greenpeace ship Arctic Sunrise in September 2013, the protestors attempted to scale a
drilling platform owned by Russian oil giant Gazprom before being captured and detained. In a
trial that Russian lawyer Anton Beneslavsky called a “political circus,” the protestors received
charges of piracy, liable for up to 15 years in prison, which were later dropped and replaced with
the lesser charge of hooliganism (“Russia grants bail,” 2013).
Critics of the trial point out that the hooligan charge was poorly justified. There are two
conditions for hooliganism: it must be carried out with the use of weapons or else by political,
ideological, racial, national, or religious hatred. In the case of the Arctic 30, there were no
weapons present, and it was unclear whether the group incited hatred and against whom (Denber,
2013). It is true that Greenpeace has spoken against Gazprom’s drilling in the Arctic Ocean
before, arguing that the company is “determined to ignore both science and good sense to drill in
remote, frozen seas” (“Greenpeace activists charged,” 2013). However, this criticism could not
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reasonably be construed as hatred. It is possible that the anti-drilling message could be seen as an
affront to Russian national interests, since much of the country’s economy is based in oil exports.
However, this still fails to meet the legal requirements of a hooliganism charge.
In addition, the Russian authorities’ seizure of the Arctic Sunrise violated both domestic
and international laws. Researchers for Human Rights Watch have observed that “both Russian
and international law provides protections to protestors, whether on land or at sea” (“Laws of
attrition,” 2013). Though Russia has not consistently protected the right to protest, the
government’s intervention was entirely arbitrary in this case. In fact, there are a number of
instances in which Russian authorities have not pressed criminal charges against Greenpeace
activists in the Arctic, making the case of the Arctic 30 an anomaly (“Laws of attrition,” 2013).
While most of the Arctic 30 activists were eventually granted bail, others faced pretrial detention
for two months under the risk of fleeing the country (PRI’s The World, 2013). Though being a
crime of greater gravity than hooliganism, piracy charges do not include pretrial detention
(“Laws of attrition,” 2013).
Because the charges against the Arctic 30 as well as their pretrial treatment are shown to
be arbitrary and even contrary to Russian law, the case is another example of the Kremlin’s
strategy of intimidation to suppress dissent. Greenpeace likely received harsher treatment on
account of its status as a ‘foreign’ NGO with non-nationals leading the protest. As such, even if
the protestors aimed to criticize only the environmental policies of Gazprom, the company is so
closely linked to the economic wellbeing of Russia that the administration likely interpreted the
event as an attack on national interests by a foreign entity. As such, officials could use the charge
of hooliganism to silence this source of opposition, though its use is not fully in concurrence
with Russian law.
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Social Deviants
Russian officials also direct hooligan charges against individuals or groups expressing
values indicative of lifestyles that are contrary to their notion of the ideal Russian. For instance,
Russian LGBTQ+ journalists and activists are regularly targeted. Often, other laws restricting
speech in addition to hooligan laws are invoked to suppress their voices. For instance, the ‘gay
propaganda’ ban of 2013 prohibits the promotion of “the denial of traditional family values”
including the portrayal of “non-traditional sexual relations” (“Online and on all fronts,” 2017).
Claiming that such provisions protect children, the Russian government imposes a blacklist on
content created by LGBTQ+ Russians on all media platforms as well as heavy fines (“Online and
on all fronts,” 2017). This closely resembles the treatment of Slava Mogutin’s works in the
1990s, which were condemned for their use of explicit language though the real issue at stake
was the content itself.
Another particularly striking example of social deviancy involves what seems to be a
harmless prank. In 2015, three young women, one of them a teenager, recorded a music video in
which they danced in front of a World War II memorial. The provocative dance move called
‘twerking’ was part of their performance. All three received hooligan charges for their
performance. The location of the video footage is significant—the memorial is positioned near
the Black Sea, expressing a “nostalgia” of sorts for Russia’s imperial past and ownership of
Ukraine (“Dispatches,” 2015, p. 12). However, the original intent of the women remains
unknown.
It is most likely the combination of manner and location that resulted in a criminal charge
for these women. While provocative dancing is not generally acceptable in public, the twerking
alone was not sufficient to earn punishment. According to the Russian Criminal Code,
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hooliganism involves a contempt for society and may also be motivated by national hatred. By
performing a socially taboo action on the premises of a symbol of imperial Russia—a Russia to
which Putin aspires to return—it would appear as if these women were seeking to defame
Russia’s ambitions. This appearance of deliberate defamation would be enough to warrant
punishment by the authorities, even if that was not the action’s intent. The perception of a social
danger, rather than the actual social danger, is what matters in Russian criminal law.
Public swearing continues to earn punishment. Leading up to the 2014 Olympic Games in
Sochi, a number of demonstrators gathered in Russia’s cities to bring attention to issues
surrounding the games, such as environmental concerns and LGBTQ+ exclusion (Kondratenko,
2014). Many were arrested and detained for periods of roughly three or four hours without access
to food or drink (Kondratenko, 2014). One activist was charged with hooliganism for swearing at
a police officer who attempted to take his passport (Kondratenko, 2014). Given the context, there
is cause to believe that the hooliganism charge was added to multiple smaller charges so that the
activist could receive harsher penalties, rather than to punish the act of swearing itself. While it is
difficult to consistently enforce restrictions on swearing in public, it is much more effective as a
tool of social control when enforced only selectively.
Ignoring Hooliganism: Violence Against LGBTQ+ Russians
Certainly, there are instances in which individuals who engage in actions that are legally
considered hooliganism evade the criminal charge on account of the social identity of their
victim, demonstrating how the laws are enforced selectively according to convenience or bias.
The LGBTQ+ community in Russia is especially vulnerable to this kind of treatment. Police
often disregard such attacks by putting the blame on the victim themselves: “It’s all right, you’re
gay so it’s normal that you were attacked” (“License to harm,” 2014, p. 61). There are limited
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legal protections for LGBTQ+ Russians and no protections against hatred based on sexual
orientation as part of the hooliganism laws. Even when using a weapon, which would be
considered part of an act of hooliganism, many Russians are able to make homophobic attacks
with impunity.
After victims report violence to the authorities, police often express an unwillingness to
investigate the case or punish the aggressor. Record-keeping is also inconsistent. In 2013, activist
Dmitry Chizhevsky was leaving the premises of an HIV prevention community center as several
men attacked him. One shot him in the left eye with a pneumatic pistol, causing him to
permanently lose his vision (“License to harm,” 2014). Though police initiated criminal
proceedings and the declared the actions of the men hooliganism, they began a drawn-out
investigation process and later dropped the case altogether, citing that they were unable to
identify the perpetrators. Chizhevsky later left Russia, stating that “it became crystal clear to me
that the situation in Russia these days is such that it is acceptable to call [LGBT] people such as
myself the fifth column” (“License to harm,” 2014, p. 62-63). Police negligence, then, sends a
signal to LGBTQ+ Russians that they would be better off by leaving Russia or else being
nonexistent—essentially implying that their rights are likewise nonexistent.
In permitting homophobic attacks, Russian authorities have signaled that acts of violence
and disturbances of the public order—crimes of no minor gravity—are justified insofar as the
target is a person who does not conform to Russian values. Whether because of one’s social
identity, lifestyle, or opinions, such a deviant cannot receive the same protections as one who
better fits the ideal. This creates a dangerous state of affairs in which individuals are
disempowered from exercising and advocating for their already tenuous rights. The rule of law,
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inconsistently or selectively enforced, is not the rule of law at all, but rather an expression of
authoritarian power.
Popular Dissent
In order to properly understand the role of hooligan laws in Russian society today, it is
necessary to distinguish it from a trend of popular dissatisfaction with the Russian government.
While few people express outright the desire for a more robust democracy due to the risks
involved in doing so, it is becoming increasingly commonplace for Russians to question the
merits of Putin’s leadership. In fact, many have abandoned harsh skepticism of Western powers
for a view that is more sympathetic, observing that much of the anti-Western rhetoric only
distracts from the problems at home (Young, 2018). Though Putin continues to garner support
from wide swaths of the population, the simmering sentiments of resistance should not be
ignored.
Young points to the existence of “liberal islands” in Russian society in a metaphorical sea
of regime supporters (2018, p. 33). Usually urban-based and educated, they demonstrate
inclinations toward “pro-market” and “pro-civil liberties” policies that are diametrically opposed
to Putin’s brand of paternalistic nationalism (Young, 2018, p. 30). Many of their grievances are
directed at deteriorating economic conditions and corruption in the political system. About a
third of the population considers poverty an “urgent concern” (Young, 2018, p. 30). Corruption
is evident in the regular shortages of medicines, negligence of the police, and a severely unequal
distribution of wealth (Young, 2018).
By no means are these islands static. Public opinion polls substantiate the claim that
opposition to the Putin administration is mounting. While only 16% of respondents to a 2007
survey indicated that they thought corruption was higher than it was in the 1990s, 52% of
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Russians reflected this sentiment in 2011 (Zakaria, 2011, p. 44). In a 2015 survey asking how
long it would take for one to run out of patience with Russia’s political and economic problems,
21% responded with “a few years” and 30% claimed that they didn’t know—“everything can
explode in a most unexpected way” (Lipman, 2016, p. 38). However, public opinion surged after
Russia annexed Crimea, with as many as 86% of Russians indicating that they felt proud of their
country, demonstrating record numbers (Young, 2018, p. 32). Nationalistic fervor tends to die
out quickly if it is not sustained.
Despite such impressive results in prior years, polls conducted in 2018 present a more
complicated portrait of public opinion. The state-run Public Opinion Foundation reported that
Putin’s approval rating had dropped to 64% during the summer of 2018 (Young, 2018, p. 29).
One would surmise that it would be in the foundation’s interests to report the highest possible
estimate to present a positive view of the administration, but the significant drop signals
widespread disappointment. In fact, Young attributes this drop in part to a proposal to raise the
retirement age over the next 15 years, though life expectancy remains relatively low (2018, p.
29). Of course, the pension controversy was one of several ill-handled policy issues, including
slow economic growth, and Russians recognize this fact—42% of Russians agreed that the
country “was headed in the wrong direction” (Young, 2018, p. 29).
As their own alternative to government mismanagement of public goods, some Russians
have initiated small-scale, crowdfunded projects to solve local issues. Claiming the public sphere
for their own, concerned citizens and activists alike have pooled their funds to host charity
events, lectures, and arts festivals with little opposition from the Kremlin (Lipman, 2016). These
efforts, however, are not sufficient to replace the support of NGOs, many of which face legal
restrictions on their activities, especially as the economy remains weak (Lipman, 2016).
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Individual donations from people with average wages simply may not be enough for projects of a
certain scale. Nonetheless, this form of activism, while not explicitly political, implies discontent
with the Putin administration.
The hooligan has been a constant figure in much of Russian history. Today, the trope is
receiving new life as a political being, a force threatening enough to the Putin administration to
warrant imprisonment and, on occasion, violence. This rejuvenation is indicative of a broader
underlying dissent in Russian society, as citizens increasingly feel powerless in the face of
rampant corruption. Like the eve of the Russian Revolution, the pressures for a more open
society under Gorbachev, and the emergence of democratic sentiment as the millennium drew
near, this could very well be the next epoch in Russia’s political development. Change is certain,
but its trajectory is difficult to predict: popular dissent may be countered by an even stronger
authoritarianism, or it may pave the way towards democracy through public demonstrations and
grassroots efforts.
Russia’s political development depends on its future approaches to policy. Will its elites
continue to express contempt for Western influence, namely its emphasis on civil and political
rights? Furthermore, will it sustain ties to its traditional allies, including the clergy of the Russian
Orthodox Church? Most importantly, it is necessary to monitor what additional restrictions the
government may place on speech as well as the extent to which it enforces its current legislation
on civil and political rights. Thus, the next step in this paper is to evaluate the legitimacy of
hooligan laws under domestic and international laws on the freedoms of speech. From there, it
will be possible to deduce whether Russia’s punishment of hooligans is a justifiable practice or a
tool of an authoritarian regime.
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Chapter IV: Legitimacy of the Hooligan Laws
Introduction
The scope and intent of the hooligan laws is clearly troubling and poses a threat to the
inception of democracy in Russia. In order to move beyond a purely normative stance and prove
the illegitimacy of these laws, it is necessary to examine their relations to both international law
and domestic law. This chapter will proceed by elucidating the rights of free speech and
expression in international law. Following will be a discussion of appropriate restrictions on
these rights accompanied by the case study of lèse-majesté laws in Thailand. The chapter will
conclude with remarks about human rights in the Russian Constitution and a final analysis of the
illegitimacy of hooligan laws as restrictions on free speech.
Russia has signed and ratified several international agreements, including the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), that contain provisions for the extent and restriction of freedom of speech and
expression. It is also a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) with
reservations involving the ban on using the death penalty as punishment and the prohibition of
discrimination. Though Russia has considered withdrawing from the European Court of Human
Rights, no such action has been taken (Kozlov, 2018). Therefore, the Russian government has
acknowledged the obligation to uphold the standards outlined in international law, even though
there are limited mechanisms for enforcement. Nonetheless, any violations of these rights could
come under scrutiny from Russia’s citizens, foreign governments, and NGOs.
The urgency of the case is reflected in the importance of the ties between freedom of
speech and the development of strong democratic institutions. In the Freedom of the World 2017
Report, the researchers of Freedom House mark several global trends in restrictions on speech,
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many of them being a cause for concern, including those which have persisted despite internal
and external pressures. The report notes (“Freedom in the world,” 2017):
All of these developments point to a growing danger that the international order of the past
quarter-century—rooted in the principles of democracy, human rights, and the rule of
law—will give way to a world in which individual leaders and nations pursue their own
narrow interests without meaningful constraints, and without regard for the shared benefits
of global peace, freedom, and prosperity.

With a Civil Liberties score of only 15/60 and a Freedom of Expression and Belief
subscore of 3/16, Russia is a major concern in and of itself (“Freedom in the world,” 2018).
Freedom House cites vague and inconsistently applied laws, poor protections for journalists, and
government surveillance capabilities as being among the chief barriers to enjoying free speech
and expression (“Freedom in the world,” 2018). Given Putin’s authoritarian posturing, it is
highly unlikely that such barriers will be removed under his term. If the hooligan laws represent
no more than the narrow interests of an authoritarian regime, then it would be sufficient cause to
pressure Russia to reform or repeal them. First, it would be productive to identify the grounds for
the trial.
Speech in International Law
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) contains the groundwork for
standards on acceptable speech and expression. Article 19 of the UDHR states: “Everyone has
the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions
without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media
and regardless of frontiers.” Russia has not included any reservations to this portion of the
Declaration and has not suggested any since its ratification, signaling an initial and continued
intent to follow it as such. As will be discussed in a later section of this chapter, even the Russian
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Constitution contains references to this intent. While it is not binding law per se, it has risen to
the status of customary law, giving other nations the power to exert pressure for compliance.
Mirroring the language of the UDHR, Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) includes the following provisions:
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom
to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers,
either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his
choice.

The most notable difference between the wording of the UDHR and that of the ICCPR is that the
latter provides a broad collection of examples for the means in which opinions may be expressed.
By expanding “media” beyond writing or speaking, Article 19 allows for the possibility of
‘speech,’ including that which is political in nature, to encompass action or performance. This
expands the scope of protection to actions such as Pussy Riot’s Punk Prayer.
At the same time, freedom of speech and expression in international law is not absolute.
There are broadly defined circumstances in which such freedoms may be restricted when they
conflict with the exercise or enjoyment of another right. Article 19 of the ICCPR continues:
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 3 of this article carries with it special
duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall
only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the right or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order, or of public health
or morals.
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The body of the convention does not further clarify these conditions, allowing the state party to
designate a national security or public moral concern itself. However, there have been cases that
attempt to define those circumstances more narrowly.
The United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) has ruled on such matters in the
1985 case of Hertzberg v Finland concerning the broadcasting of program segments containing
references to homosexuality. While the context of this case evades the scope of this paper, the
Committee’s final ruling deserves attention (O’Flaherty, 2012, p. 641):
Public morals differ widely. There is no universally applicable common standard.
Consequently, in this respect, a certain margin of discretion must be accorded to the
responsible national authorities.

O’Flaherty notes that this has been the only case that “invoked such a margin of discretion,”
demonstrating its relative novelty as a guiding legal principle (2012, p. 641). In fact, the notion is
rejected in the UNHRC’s General Comment no. 34, drafted in 2011. The comment makes clear
that even when the protection of public health or morals is the motive, states are still required to
demonstrate “in specific fashion the precise nature of the threat,” thus preventing arbitrary or
wide-reaching restrictions on speech. Though Russia may choose to restrict speech based on this
principle, there is simply a lack of precedent to determine whether such a restriction is
legitimate.
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), as the guiding document of the
European Court of Human Rights, further clarifies the legal protections for civil and political
rights. Russia has been a state party since 1996 and thus is liable to have charges of human rights
violations brought against it by other state parties. Much of Article 10 of the ECHR states
verbatim the provisions of Article 19 of the UDHR and Article 19 of the ICCPR. However, there
are a few notable restrictions on speech that are not present in the UDHR or ICCPR:
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2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may
be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law
and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and
impartiality of the judiciary.”

At first glance, the hooligan laws may seem legitimate since Russian authorities have
invoked motivations such as the “prevention of disorder or crime” and the “protection of…
morals.” However, the case of Handyside v. United Kingdom in the European Court of Human
Rights will shed light on an exception. In regards to the possible obscenity of the material in
question, the ECHR ruled:
[F]reedom of expression… is applicable not only to “information” or “ideas” that are
favourably received… but also to those which offend, shock, or disturb the State or any
other sector of the population. Such are the demands of pluralism, tolerance and
broadmindedness without which there is no “democratic society”.

That being said, the mere appeal to morals in order to protect the public from provocative speech
is not sufficient grounds for its restriction. In order to best protect the freedoms of its citizens, a
state must be ready to justify its restrictive policies on other grounds.
As a concluding note on international legal standards, it is essential to point out that the
duty of the state in protecting speech is twofold: it has both a negative duty and a positive one. In
addition to delineating the circumstances in which speech is protected a state must also actively
“[ensure] an adequate space in society for free expression” (O’Flaherty, 2012, p. 639). When
considering Russia specifically, it is important to keep in mind its performance regarding this
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goal. Would debilitating fines worth up to a year’s salary, a lack of rights in court, and arbitrary
mishandling by the police constitute an “adequate space” for speech? These matters will be
considered in detail later in the chapter.
When Can Speech Be Restricted?
The UDHR and ICCPR recognize that, while free speech and expression are among the
chief human rights since they precede the enjoyment of other rights, they are not absolute. As
was previously discussed, restrictions apply under a set of circumstances, left flexible in
definition. In order to account for what otherwise might be a vague provision, the ICCPR
provides a process for which to evaluate a state’s policies:
When a State party invokes a legitimate ground for restriction of freedom of expression, it
must demonstrate in specific and individualized fashion the precise nature of the threat and
the necessity and proportionality of the specific action taken, in particular by establishing
a direct and immediate connection between the expression and the threat.

The ICCPR is clear about the spirit in which these standards are imposed: “Any such limitations
must be understood in the light of universality of human rights and the principle of nondiscrimination.”
To further illustrate how these provisions are meant to reflect a universal view of human
rights, the ICCPR provides cases in which it is inconsistent with the spirit of the document’s
norms to restrict speech:
It is not compatible with the covenant for a restriction to be enshrined in traditional,
religious, or other such customary law… [T]he purpose of protecting morals must be based
on principles not deriving exclusively from a single tradition.

By calling for multiple influences and traditions to be involved in creating a law that may restrict
other rights, the ICCPR lessens the chances of an arbitrary law being put into place. If a law is
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truly reflective of the needs and preferences of the population, then it will include multiple
aspects of their lives. Otherwise, it would be easier for a single authority figure or dominant
group—gaining power from custom, politics, or religion—to monopolize the rule of law and
distort it for personal gain.
Furthermore, the ICCPR expresses concern for specific justifications in restricting
speech, once again demonstrating the need to uphold the rule of law:
States parties should consider the decriminalization of defamation and, in any case, the
application of the criminal law should only be countenanced in the most serious of cases
and imprisonment is never an appropriate penalty.

As will be seen in the examination of lèse-majesté laws in Thailand, the crime of defamation is
often invoked as a political tool and curtails the exercise of a wide range of other rights. That
being said, the very act of punishing speech under criminal law, especially when it does not
present an immediate link to danger, is contrary to the norms advanced in the ICCPR. Such a
punishment serves to reinforce existing, often authoritarian, structures of power and hampers the
development of democratic institutions.
By placing the burden of proof on the state in question, the ICCPR encourages
accountability despite its lack of enforceable sanctions. If the state provides a contrived or
generalized reason for imposing a restriction on speech or fails to identify the threat involved,
then this warrants any one of several appropriate responses from other states parties. These are
meant to address inconsistencies either in the theory or practice of the law. Other states may call
for the reform or repeal of a law, or the actions of authorities may be put under investigation in
order to prevent further acts of noncompliance. The former approach has been suggested to
remedy the lèse-majesté laws in Thailand. Bodies such as the ECHR, however, do carry the
power to place sanctions on states parties, but may use these mechanisms strategically so as to
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not strain diplomatic relations. Both may be used in concert to promote accountability to
overlapping standards.
Lèse-majesté Laws in Thailand
Though similar laws are disappearing globally, lèse-majesté laws, which seek to protect
the honor of the king, his heirs, and other noble figures against defamation, continue to persist in
Thailand (Baber, 2014). This has come at the cost of prison time for journalists, scholars, and
citizens who offer critique of the monarchy with sentences ranging from three to fifteen years
(Baber, 2014). While other defamation laws of lesser gravity exist in Thailand’s criminal code,
the lèse-majesté laws are unique for two reasons: they presume ill intent thus removing the need
to prove the speech’s intent in court and do not offer exemptions for guilt from this intent
(Greenfield, 2013, p. 381-382). In addition, anyone may bring up a lèse-majesté charge
regardless of their connection to the royal family or proof that the statement in question would
actually be insulting to the royal family (Greenfield, 2013).
Despite the continued symbolic importance of Thailand’s monarchy, lèse-majesté laws
are not, in and of themselves, a cultural development. If this was the case, the law would not
have been subject to dramatic revisions and would have been applied consistently over time. At
the very least, it would not be sensitive to regime changes and would have stayed firmly in the
scope of the monarchy’s abilities. This is contrary to the reality.
Though the law entered the legal code at the beginning of the 20th century, its terms were
strengthened in 1957 in response to political unrest in 1932 that “jeopardized” the “strength of
the monarchy” (Baber, 2014, p. 696). The law has seen a resurgence in recent years as the
military-led government sought to secure its rule. While there had been of average of five cases
of lèse-majesté per year from 1992-2004, this has skyrocketed to a rate of 231 cases between
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2006-2008 (Baber, 2014, p. 707). This authoritarian pattern of behavior has been demonstrated
in other areas of Thai politics, as the same party has placed restrictions on expression and the
dissemination of information that “challenges or even differs from the official story of the coup”
(Haberkorn, 2018, p. 936).
Drawing from a Thai expression, Haberkorn identifies this undue restriction of human
rights and arbitrary punishment as a way for the ruling party to “[kill] the chicken to scare the
monkey”—in other words, to ensure compliance and silence through “harsh repression upon a
few” (2018, p. 936). In this way, individuals are compelled to resort to self-censorship in order to
preserve their safety and reputation. In the meantime, they are powerless in facilitating the
creation of democratic institutions or spreading democratic norms themselves while they may
have been able to do so in the past. These “monkeys,” then, cannot hear, speak, or act against the
injustices of an authoritarian regime—that is, until they find an unlikely ally.
One of the strongest points of criticism against the lèse-majesté laws comes from the king
of Thailand himself. Baber calls attention to the remarks given by the now deceased King
Bhumibol Adulyadej in a 2005 speech: “[But] that the king can do no wrong is very much an
insult to the King…because this shows that they regard that the King is not human. But the King
can do wrong” (2014, p. 711). This statement is contrary to the policies of the government,
which has wielded power in the judicial branch to punish any matter of direct or indirect insult to
the monarchy (Baber, 2014). In this way, it is clear that these laws are not truly meant to
preserve the institution of the monarchy as a part of Thailand’s cultural heritage, but as a way for
the military-led dominant party to maintain a vice grip on Thai politics.
Generally, legal scholars and activists have offered two solutions to the injustices brought
about by the Thai lèse-majesté laws: reforming the laws or repealing them altogether. While
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these options seem to be mutually exclusive, the first may precede the second, securing an even
greater victory for human rights in Thailand.
Those in favor of the first approach note that lèse-majesté laws may be brought in line
with other Thai defamation laws administering a lighter punishment (Greenfield, 2013).
Greenfield suggests three specific avenues: removing the assumption of ill intent and allowing
“good faith” expressions, interpreting the law more narrowly, and allowing the monarchy to have
the final say in pressing charges (2013, p. 393-396). This course of action has a lesser chance of
being resisted by the current regime, but still allows for the possibility of an eventual cessation of
charges. In addition, it protects against the possible backlash of an “instantaneous” repeal, which
may pose a threat to national security (Baber, 2014, p. 726).
Still, others suggest that the laws be repealed entirely in order to signal a greater
commitment to international norms. When they are the only ones of its kind left in existence, it is
only just to abolish them (Baer, 2014). The fact alone that other countries with equivalent laws
have rid their codes of them lends credence to a shift in global norms—one that decries the
citation of tradition as a means to silence political opposition. O’Flaherty points out that the
ICCPR General Comment no. 34 explicitly voices a commitment to the “decriminalization of
defamation,” thus setting it as a salient goal in progressing human rights (2012, p. 649). Similar
rhetoric has been used to condemn religious defamation laws, such as those in Saudi Arabia,
which are similar in intent to the Thai laws. Surely this commitment applies not only to the
protection of defamation of monarchical figures or clerics but of other political leaders as well.
How Legitimate are the Hooligan Laws?
The prior examination of international law standards of free speech and expression, as
well as the elucidation of two relevant controversies, serves as the backdrop for analyzing the
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legitimacy of the Russian hooligan laws. This section will begin with a discussion on speech
protections under Russian law, namely those contained in the Russian Constitution. Next, the
international standards from previous sections will be linked directly to the actions of Russian
authorities. Finally, the section will conclude by identifying the responses of various actors,
including foreign governments, NGOs, and activists within Russia. All of these components
serve to illustrate the unjust use of these laws toward authoritarian ends.
Among other goals, and despite the efforts of Russian officials to ignore it, the Russian
Constitution clearly sets an intent to uphold the standards set forth in international law and to
pursue a fully democratic society:
…[P]roceeding from universally acknowledged principles of equality and selfdetermination of peoples… reviving the sovereign statehood of Russia and asserting the
firmness of its democratic basis… recognizing ourselves to be a part of the world
community…

Article 15 reflects this principle in greater detail:
4. Universally recognized principles and norms of international law as well as international
agreements of the Russian Federation should be an integral part of its legal system. If an
international agreement of the Russian Federation establishes rules, which differ from
those stipulated by law, then the rules of the international agreement shall be applied.

This may be interpreted as an instance of monism, in which a state actively incorporates
international law into its own legal system and, in the event of a contradiction, alters domestic
law. In contrast, a dualist conception of law, such as that used in United States law, views
international and domestic law as separate, and as such the two may stand at odds. It is evident
that Russia’s Constitution allows for an active role in world affairs though the state’s motivations
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may be self-interested. Nonetheless, these provisions leave little room for Russia to assert its
own standard of human rights protections over any universal standard.
That being said, a continued reading of the Constitution bolsters the position that Russia
is legally bound to uphold its duties according to international law. Article 2 asserts: “Man, his
rights and freedoms shall be the supreme value. The recognition, observance and protection of
human and civil rights and freedoms shall be an obligation of the state.” Therefore, Russian law
acknowledges the role of the state to fulfill both negative duties, including protection, and
positive duties, such as recognition and observance. Since the freedoms of speech and expression
qualify as human rights, specifically civil and political rights, they deserve this same
guardianship. Any undue restriction on these freedoms would signal a failure of the state in
adequately preserving the supreme value of its citizens.
Article 13 discusses additional rights associated with speech and expression. It is likely
that these were included as reactions to the lack of these freedoms under the single-party Soviet
regime and as mechanisms to prevent totalitarian rule in the future. The Article proceeds as such:
1. Ideological diversity shall be recognized in the Russian Federation.
2. No ideology shall be proclaimed as State ideology or as obligatory.
3. Political diversity and the multi-party system shall be recognized in the Russian
Federation.
4. Public associations shall be equal before the law.
5. The establishment and activities of public associations whose goals and activities are
aimed at the forcible changing of the basis of the constitutional order and at violating the
integrity of the Russian Federation, at undermining its security, at creating armed units,
and at instigating social, racial, national and religious strife shall be prohibited.
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One may observe an apparent contradiction between sections 1 and 5. Though
“ideological diversity” is legally recognized, associations who meet the criteria of section 5 are
explicitly prohibited. At first, it may seem as if groups such as Pussy Riot and the Arctic 30 are
punishable due to the highly political nature of their criticisms. However, it would take a stretch
of imagination to argue that their primary goal is to change the “basis of the constitutional
order,” and especially when no violence was used. In fact, by asking the leaders of their country
to hold themselves accountable for their actions—a keystone of a democratic system—these
groups are doing just the opposite. Therefore, they cannot be found in violation of the provisions
of Article 13.
Article 29 further expands on the principles underlying acceptable speech and expression:
1. Everyone shall be guaranteed freedom of thought and speech.
2. Propaganda or agitation, which arouses social, racial, national or religious hatred and
hostility shall be prohibited. Propaganda of social, racial, national, religious or linguistic
supremacy shall also be prohibited.

Like the hooligan laws, the Constitution invokes the concept of “social, racial, national or
religious hatred” brought about by “agitation.” However, the term “agitation” implies a certain
level of violence or offensiveness that invokes such hatred in the audience. Furthermore, as is
shown in the cases of hooliganism discussed in the previous chapter, the perceptions of intent
made by Russian authorities often differed greatly from the actual motivations of the individual
or group in question. In cases such as the violence against LGBTQ+ Russians, acts of hatred
were ignored due to the homophobic bias of the authorities involved.
Contrast the hooligan laws with legitimate restrictions on hate speech as demonstrated by
two ECHR cases. Pavel Ivanov v. Russia concerns a newspaper editor and owner who
disseminated anti-Semitic ideas through a series of articles portraying Jewish people as a source
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of evil in Russian society (“Hate speech,” 2019). The Court ruled that his actions, especially
given their wide reach through mass media, were indeed an incitement to ethnic hatred and
therefore were not protected. As for an example of religious hatred, the case of Norwood v. the
United Kingdom is especially illustrative. The individual in question received charges after
displaying a poster with the slogan “Islam out of Britain—Protect the British People”
emblazoned on a picture of the burning Twin Towers (“Hate speech,” 2019, p. 4). In a general
and vehement attack against Muslims as a whole, reasoned the Court, the individual had acted in
a way that contrary to the Convention’s values, including tolerance and social peace.
Generally speaking, each case of hate speech mentioned included two components: a
specific target and a broad reach in which all members of the group in question were treated as a
whole. Furthermore, the Court clearly articulated how each act was contrary to the values of its
Convention rather than appealing to vague notions of nationalism or other types of rhetoric.
Nonviolent acts of hooliganism expressing a political stance do not target groups but rather
policies and the actions of government officials, and thus do not constitute hate speech according
to ECHR standards. The homophobic attacks of uncharged hooligans, however, would likely
qualify.
A final note on civil and political rights in the Russian Constitution would clarify the
specific rights of expression for groups. Article 31 states: “Citizens of the Russian Federation
shall have the right to assemble peacefully, without weapons, hold rallies, mass meetings and
demonstrations, marches and pickets.” Where the nature of the message is concerned, given the
fact that the citizens are in fact assembling peacefully, the Constitution is silent. This implies that
cases of nonviolent hooliganism, wherein charges are brought forth solely because of the
political content of the act, are within the scope of the rights outlined in the Constitution.
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As for limitations on all of the rights discussed, Article 55 reaffirms the primacy of
international standards and accepts the terms of restrictions put forth in the UDHR and the
ICCPR:
3. Human and civil rights and freedoms may be limited by federal law only to the extent
necessary for the protection of the basis of the constitutional order, morality, health, rights
and lawful interests of other people, and for ensuring the defence of the country and the
security of the State.

Of course, as was demonstrated by the ECHR case of Hertzberg v. Finland, there is no
predetermined method for determining what exactly constitutes public order or morality.
However, the ICCPR General Comment no. 34 condemns the use of an arbitrary margin of
discretion. In this light, since Russian law contains an express commitment to the participation in
the international community and an internalization of the community’s values, it is this same
group that can evaluate the legitimacy of controversial Russian policies.
Consistency with Law
The actions carried about by Russian authorities, as described in previous chapters, make
it clear that hooliganism is regarded as a type of speech. Though the exact nature of the crime
has morphed over Russia’s history, starting with distinctly apolitical acts such as public
drunkenness, it has taken on a political character beginning with the Soviet era. Since then,
individuals have been branded as hooligans as a way for Russian elites to silence their voices.
Surely unruly and even violent hooliganism continues to exist. However, with a myriad of other
criminal charges at the Russian government’s arsenal, there is no legal reason to criminally
prosecute nonviolent forms of expression in the same way that rowdiness and swearing have
historically been prosecuted. Thus, if an act of hooliganism is punished on account of its
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message, whether underlying or overt, then it shall be subject to laws regarding speech and
expression.
When addressing potential violations of the law when multiple systems of law are in
question, it is simplest to begin with domestic law. If a policy is found to be inconsistent with the
principles of the state’s own legal system, then it cannot continue as such. However, the Russian
Constitution explicitly states a commitment to upholding the standards of international law. In
other words, it reflects a stance of monism in which domestic law must defer to international
law. As such, it is not necessary to appeal solely to Russian domestic law in order to evaluate the
ultimate legitimacy of the hooligan laws.
Recall that the UDHR and the ICCPR contain criteria for legitimate restrictions on
speech and expression. The state in question must determine the exact nature of the threat
brought about by the expression and any response must be proportionate. In the charges of
hooliganism that this paper has discussed, there has been no attempt to meet either of these
criteria. In fact, as in the case of the members of Pussy Riot, individuals are often subject to
periods of pretrial detention that are not proportionate to the gravity of the crime. The Russian
Criminal Code does not consider hooliganism a crime of sufficient gravity to be punished in this
way, demonstrating a blatant abuse of power.
While public officials, Orthodox Church clergy, and other figureheads spoke out on the
threat of Pussy Riot’s Punk Prayer to public morals, they have also failed to define what those
public morals actually entail. In addition, as illustrated by the cases of Hertzberg v. Finland and
Handyside v. United Kingdom, speech which shocks and offends the public—including those
who find themselves in a position of elite power—deserves protection. Such speech may not be
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overtly political, as with the twerking performance, but nonetheless expresses a message that is
meant to challenge public perception.
The triduum of political, religious, and cultural power in Russia is a complex entity, and
while these forces have had a distinct impact on the course of Russian history, they are by no
means immutable. In the previous example of Pussy Riot and in the case of homosexual
journalists such as Slava Mogutin, the preservation of this tripartite concoction seems to be the
primary motive. There is an underlying logic that criticism of one component is criticism of all
three and is thus a threat to Russia’s internal affairs. However, this is mainly a rhetorical strategy
used by Putin to deflect criticism of his actions, especially when they are not consistent with the
‘Russian values’ to which he appeals. Those values have certainly not been stable throughout the
tumultuous 20th century, as Russia redefined itself as a socialist nation and then again as a
budding democracy. When values change in a short time, evident by public opinion polls
showing declining levels of satisfaction with his political performance, it is not valid to appeal to
ideals that no longer hold sway.
Here, one can make a valid comparison between the hooligan laws and Thai lèse-majesté
laws to further illustrate their inconsistencies with international law. While each is defended as
protecting an institution or set of ideals considered fundamental to their respective cultures, they
are both wielded excessively as tools of political control. If they truly were protective of cultural
values, then the nature of the crime would not change over time and especially not with regime
changes. The number of charges for each crime varied greatly between time periods and even
surged during periods when the regime in power aimed to further legitimize its power. For
Thailand, this was the military coup of 1932; for Russia, this was the inception of Soviet rule as
well as the transition away from democracy after Yeltsin. While politics may heavily influence
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culture and vice versa, they are not to be equated. Thus, the cultural relativist argument that
hooligan laws seek to protect Russian cultural values does not hold sway.
Another argument against the legitimacy of hooligan laws is the outcry that such charges
earn. Though Russian law seeks to insulate the workings of its government from foreign
influences, officials cannot write off such criticism as meddling—if Russia ratifies international
law, it is liable to criticism from international sources. For instance, during the pretrial detention
of the Arctic 30 activists, NGOs such as Human Rights Watch called for an immediate release of
custody and the dropping of all charges (Denber, 2013). The rationale was that such a charge was
“distorted and disproportionate,” since the protests involved neither the use of weapons nor a
discernible motivation of hatred (Denber, 2013).
As for the plight of the Arctic 30 protestors, Amnesty International has contested the
grounds of their hooligan charges and has questioned the logic of the laws themselves. The
Europe and Central Asia Programme Director John Dalhuisen emphasizes that while hooligan
charges are based on the presence of violence, the Arctic 30 certainly did not meet this criteria as
they were “engaging in peaceful protest” (“’Hooliganism’ charges do not apply,” 2013).
Furthermore, he criticizes Russian authorities for having an “ulterior motive behind their
repeated attempts to use criminal charges” when lesser, non-criminal charges are available and
appropriate (“’Hooliganism’ charges do not apply,” 2013). By extension, all other cases of
nonviolent hooliganism should not face this criminal procedure. Some acts of hooliganism could
be covered by other criminal laws with milder sentences, while others should not receive charges
at all. However, the ulterior motive for punishing certain acts, especially as exercises of
expression, should not be ignored.
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The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has also taken a clear stance on the
hooligan laws, siding with Pussy Riot. In July 2018, the court ordered Russia to compensate the
band members 50,000 euros ($58,000 USD) for damages during their trial following Punk
Prayer (Kozlov, 2018). No remedy would have been requested unless, of course, legitimate
damage was done. ECtHR representatives noted that the punishment “for simply having worn
brightly colored clothes, waved their arms and kicked their legs around and used strong
language”—that is, for having expressed themselves in a provocative but ultimately nonviolent
way—was “exceptionally severe” (Kozlov, 2018). Moreover, the ECtHR did acknowledge the
performance as an act of political speech, unlike the Russian courts, which upheld its conviction
of religious hatred (Voorhoof, 2018).
Though the ECtHR did not explicitly call for a reform or repeal of the hooligan laws, it
has sent a clear message that they can be used as an instrument of violating human rights. In fact,
the ECtHR defended the performance as an exercise of the freedom of artistic expression, with
conduct being a valid form of this expression (Voorhoof, 2018). As long as authorities continue
to harshly regulate and punish public conduct on account of its political content, even expressed
artistically or abstractly, the state is failing in protecting human rights. As Russia is currently
considering a withdrawal from the ECtHR, and thus an avoidance of the responsibilities that
come with membership, its officials are likely aware of that fact as well.
Hooligan laws are contrary to both the letter and the spirit of international law standards
regarding speech and expression. By criminally punishing those who criticize leaders or policies
with their nonviolent actions, Russia has failed in its duty as a state to create space for free
expression. Its noncompliance with international law alone is one violation of its own
constitution—its deep disregard for the human rights of its own citizens, international standards
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notwithstanding, is another. If anything, it is the so-called hooligans that take action to oppose
Putin’s authoritarian policies that are maintaining—not threatening—the constitutional order.
Perhaps the true hooligans are the ones who enforce such laws. In doing so, they are expressing
national hatred by failing to uphold the standards of their own country’s constitution.
If Russia truly wishes to abide by its own constitution and pursue the trappings of a
democratic state, then hooligan laws have no place in Russian society. They must be abolished in
their entirety. Why not weakened, as some suggest as the ideal fate for lèse-majesté laws? The
answer is simple: the Criminal Code already accounts separately for crimes lumped together as
“hooliganism.” In their own contexts, of course, they are stripped of their covert political
meanings. For the case of physical assault (murder notwithstanding), Articles 111-118 are
sufficient. Theft, swindling, robbery, and other related acts are covered by Articles 158-164.
Destruction of property is outlined in Articles 167-168. If any of the above occurs, then it should
be punished for exactly what it is. The hooligan laws, seen through the lens of the Criminal Code
in which they live, are proven to be redundant.
The final nail in the coffin for the hooligan laws is the inconsistency with which they are
applied. As one of the cornerstones of a functioning democracy, the rule of law must be
upheld—any nascent democracy would be wise to follow this standard. Recall the fact that many
instances of hooliganism against LGBTQ+ Russians, much of them involving violence or threats
of death, are left unpunished. Here, one can observe a contradiction: though the act is carried out
using weapons and is motivated by hatred—social hatred specifically—it is pardoned on account
of the victim’s identity. Such abuse of power cannot be tolerated.
A full-scale repeal of the hooligan laws is an urgent task if the country wishes to carry
out the democratic inclinations outlined in its own constitution. Unless, of course, the leaders of
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Russia reject that their country is democratic, which would be a singular threat to the
constitutional order. In fact, the violation of the equality of human and civil rights is a crime
outlined in Article 136 of the Criminal Code:
Discrimination, that is, violation of the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of man and
citizen based on gender, race, nationality, language, origin, property or official status, place
or residence, attitude to religion, convictions, or affiliation with public associations or any
social groups, made by a person through the use of the official position thereof–shall be
punishable.

The evidence against Putin and his regime is overwhelming—Article 213 of the Russian
Criminal Code is inconsistent with international human rights norms, unconstitutional in
execution, and undemocratic in intent.
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Chapter V: Conclusion
Performing Resistance
The performance has not yet ended. In 2014, Nadya Tolokonnikova of Pussy Riot
launched the subversive web outlet MediaZona. Focusing on criminal justice news that would
otherwise be censored in mainstream Russian media, the mission of the site is to counter the
information hegemony of Russia’s elite. By 2016, the website had about 2.2 million visitors a
month (Weber, 2016). Today, the website’s headlines prominently feature those parts of society
which Putin and his officials keep under wraps: policy brutality, the persecution of Jehovah’s
Witnesses, and the mobilization of activist groups, among other forbidden topics. When
interviewed by Reuters about the motivations behind MediaZona, Tolokonnikova replied: “The
real punk is to build institutions” (Weber, 2016).
Tolokonnikova’s comment parallels the sentiment behind the actions of her fellow
hooligans who, through a public performance of resistance, exposed the contradictions of power
in Russia and called for a more open political system. Shifting from a socially-sanctioned set of
public behaviors to a legally-sanctioned category of actions arbitrarily receiving punishment,
hooliganism has become code for political speech. In appealing to a set of mythic, ‘traditional’
values, Putin has carefully groomed public opinion in support of his policies. In the meantime, he
is endorsing actions that are contrary to the laws of Russia itself, international law
notwithstanding. In a world where scholars and policymakers sympathetic to democratic
institutions have cause for concern, this development is not simply troubling—it is deadly.
And so it continues. In March 2019, the Russian parliament instituted a new set of laws to
further insulate the government from criticism. The first outlaws “blatant disrespect” of the state,
government officials, and society, and the second bans the sharing of “false information of public
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interest, shared under the guise of fake news” (“Russia laws ban,” 2019). Though parliament
members tout the policies as promoting “discipline” and “greater accountability” of citizens,
critics have called it “barbaric” and repressive of journalists (“Russia laws ban,” 2019). Such
policies are likely to lead to self-censorship as journalists and activists face a new set of potential
charges. In this way, the parliament, too, has been instrumental in transferring moral leadership
to state hands, giving it the exclusive power to create, regulate, and enforce its norms.
In the dichotomy of power relations in Russia throughout its history, hooligans have
stood firmly opposed to those who claim moral leadership. The exact nature of the elite group
has shifted over time and has included a broad range of individuals such as religious leaders,
media oligopolists, and executive offices. In turn, the parameters of the hooligan laws have been
adjusted to fit the methods, message, and membership of the societal elite and not to an enduring
cultural idea of hooliganism. By engineering the idea of public conduct through law and force,
Russian elites have reinforced their power. Putin, then, is no exception. However, it is his
augmentation of this enforcement, as well as his equation of regime loyalty with ideal Russian
living, that belie his authoritarian ambitions.
Furthermore, the inconsistency of his own policy actions, including but not limited to
hooliganism, with the Russian Constitution are particularly striking. Underlying all of these is a
disregard for the Constitution’s own allegiance to democratic values and pledged participation in
the international community. In actively violating the norms of the international community,
especially those regarding freedom of speech and expression, the Putin administration seems
complacent with Russia’s failure to uphold the rights of its own citizens. According to the view
that one of the primary duties of states is to fulfill such rights, Russia has failed as a state. By no
means are the hooligan laws the only instance of unjust restrictions on rights, but a close study of
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them can provide the means for identifying, investigating, and eradicating others of a similar
nature.
Applications and Future Research
Surely, the Russian hooligan has counterparts around the globe as political dissidents and
social deviants are tolerated—or punished—in varying degrees. As was shown with lèse-majesté
laws in Thailand, the perceived dangers of freedom of speech and expression may be
inconsistent with reality. As such, one of the major contributions of this work to the study of
international law and civil and political rights is its demonstration of how such restrictions on
speech are expressions of authoritarian power, not necessarily cultural imperatives. The same
tools of analysis may be used to evaluate religious defamation laws, for example, which persist
in states such as Saudi Arabia and Morocco. Decoupling the culture from the content will be key
in arguing for reforms.
On a more localized scale, the points brought up in this paper as well as its synthesis of a
variety of sources could serve the study of crime in Russia in a broad sense. In uncovering the
origins of hooliganism as a crime, tracing its codification and modification as law, and pointing
out its abuse, this research presents a possible methodology for studying other crimes in depth.
Due to the sometimes rapid ideology changes present throughout Russia’s history, it is necessary
to place these laws in a greater context to fully understand their function. For human rights
activists in Russia, especially, a deep analysis as such can serve as a powerful tool in exposing
the arbitrary nature of punishing certain actions.
Winning the 2018 presidential election in Russia, Putin is set to spend six more years in
office. If his authoritarian inclinations continue, one may expect more crackdown on dissident
and further restrictions on civil and political rights. It is imperative during this time for human

92

rights watchdog groups to closely monitor his policy initiatives and, if needed, recruit the help of
international sympathizers. Hooliganism and other crimes may be punished even more harshly
than before or may include additional, wider-reaching provisions. As such, the understanding of
these crimes will need to be updated to account for these changes. In the meantime, this work
presents a logical and comprehensive methodological framework that can accommodate future
insights.
Closing Remarks
James Scott cautions against a sharp separation of ‘real’ resistance and incidental
activities which may appear subversive but are no more than isolated, apolitical phenomena. To
do so would be to misconstrue the very relations of power within a given society. When power is
highly concentrated into elite hands, non-elites may lack the resources and agency to speak out in
more formalized ways. As elections in Russia are proven to be more theatrical than genuine,
conventional methods in creating political change are no longer accessible. Action, and even
non-action, are potent forms of speech.
In reclaiming public space from Russian elites, individuals branded as hooligans perform
resistance. This performance, however, is not to be understood as a singular, self-serving act.
Rather, it sends a mission of an alternative order of things beyond the elite values of autocracy,
nationality, and orthodoxy. For Pussy Riot, it is a separation of church and state power as well as
greater state transparency. For the Arctic 30, it is a responsible management of natural resources
and a more equitable distribution of the country’s wealth. For LGBTQ+ Russians who publish
their experiences, it is safety from the physical violence and discrimination which threaten the
rule of law. Each of these acknowledges the crucial role of civil and political rights in countering
injustice. None of these allow space for authoritarian rule or narrow ‘cultural’ concepts of rights
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that are, in reality, constructed by Russia’s elites. It is time for Putin and his officials to make a
choice: acknowledge and embrace these norms or admit Russia’s failure in upholding its own
standards of governance. Perhaps his vision for an authoritarian Russia deserves a curtain call—
not with the thunderous applause of his supporters but rather the outraged voices of dissent.
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